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Misinformation Mayhem:
Social Media Platforms’ Efforts to Combat Medical and Political Misinformation
– Dawn Carla Nunziato1
INTRODUCTION
Social media platforms today are playing an ever-expanding role in shaping the
contours of today’s information ecosystem.2 The events of recent months have driven home
this development, as the platforms have shouldered the burden and attempted to rise to the
challenge of ensuring that the public is informed – and not misinformed – about matters
affecting our democratic institutions in the context of our elections, as well as about matters
affecting our very health and lives in the context of the pandemic. This Article examines
the extensive role recently assumed by social media platforms in the marketplace of ideas
in the online sphere, with an emphasis on their efforts to combat medical misinformation
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as their efforts to combat false political
speech in the 2020 election cycle. In the context of medical misinformation surrounding
the COVID-19 pandemic, this Article analyzes the extensive measures undertaken by the
major social media platforms to combat such misinformation. In the context of
misinformation in the political sphere, this Article examines the distinctive problems
brought about by the microtargeting of political speech and by false political ads on social
media in recent years, and the measures undertaken by major social media companies to
address such problems. In both contexts, this Article examines the extent to which such
measures are compatible with First Amendment substantive and procedural values.
Social media platforms are essentially attempting to address today’s serious
problems alone, in the absence of federal or state regulation or guidance in the United
States. Despite the major problems caused by Russian interference in our 2016 elections,
the U.S. has failed to enact regulations prohibiting false or misleading political advertising
on social media – whether originating from foreign sources or domestic ones – because of
First Amendment, legislative, and political impediments to such regulation. And the
federal government has failed miserably in its efforts to combat COVID-19 or the medical
1
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misinformation that has contributed to the spread of the virus in the U.S. All of this
essentially leaves us (in the United States, at least) solely in the hands, and at the mercy,
of the platforms themselves, to regulate our information ecosystem (or not), as they see fit.
The dire problems brought about by medical and political misinformation online in
recent months and years have ushered in a sea change in the platforms’ attitudes and
approaches toward regulating content online. In recent months, for example, Twitter has
evolved from being the non-interventionist “free speech wing of the free speech party”3 to
designing and operating an immense operation for regulating speech on its platform –
epitomized by its recent removal4 and labeling5 of President Donald Trump’s (and Donald
Trump, Jr.’s) misleading tweets. Facebook for its part has evolved from being a notorious
haven for fake news in the 2016 election cycle6 to standing up an extensive global network
of independent fact-checkers to remove and label millions of posts on its platform –
including by removing a post from President Trump’s campaign account, as well as by
labeling 90 million such posts in March and April 2020, involving false or misleading
medical information in the context of the pandemic. Google for its part has abandoned its
hands-off approach to its search algorithm results and has committed to removing false
political content in the context of the 2020 election7 and to serving up prominent
information by trusted health authorities in response to COVID-19 related searches on its
platforms.8
These approaches undertaken by the major social media platforms are generally
consistent with First Amendment values, both the substantive values in terms of what
constitutes protected and unprotected speech, and the procedural values, in terms of process
accorded to users whose speech is restricted or otherwise subject to action by the platforms.
As I discuss below, the platforms have removed speech that is likely to lead to imminent
harm and have generally been more aggressive in responding to medical misinformation
3
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than political misinformation. This approach tracks First Amendment substantive values,
which accord lesser protection for false and misleading claims regarding medical
information than for false and misleading political claims. The platforms’ approaches
generally adhere to First Amendment procedural values as well, including by specifying
precise and narrow categories of what speech is prohibited, providing clear notice to
speakers who violate their rules regarding speech, applying their rules consistently, and
according an opportunity for affected speakers to appeal adverse decisions regarding their
content.
While the major social media platforms’ intervention in the online marketplace of
ideas is not without its problems and not without its critics, this Article contends that this
trend is by and large a salutary development – and one that is welcomed by the vast
majority of Americans9 and that has brought about measurable improvements in the online
information ecosystem.10 Recent surveys and studies show that such efforts are welcomed
by Americans11 and are moderately effective in reducing the spread of misinformation and
in improving the accuracy of beliefs of members of the public.12 In the absence of effective
regulatory measures in the United States to combat medical and political misinformation
online,13 social media companies should be encouraged to continue to experiment with
9
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developing and deploying even more effective measures to combat such misinformation,
consistent with our First Amendment substantive and procedural values.
I. Platforms’ Efforts to Address Medical Misinformation in the Context of the Pandemic
In recent months, arguably the most important challenge for social media platforms
has been responding to the rampant spread of medical misinformation in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic. With a significant portion of the global community under some kind
of lockdown order (one third of the global population, by one estimate14), Internet
connectivity – and Internet content – are playing a more significant societal role than ever.
In contrast to their previous hands-off position, the major platforms have risen to the
challenge and have taken decisive action in response to medical misinformation in the
context of the pandemic. The predominant focus across platforms has been on the curbing
of false information, especially that which tends to encourage the spread of imminently
harmful information about the virus. The platforms’ actions taken in response to COVID19-related medical misinformation have generally been more aggressive than their
response to misinformation in the political arena, which is consistent with First
Amendment substantive values that accord lesser protection for false and misleading
statements of fact than for false and misleading political claims (as I discuss below). And
One Year On: Online Platforms Submit Self-Assessment Reports, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_19_6166.
See Facebook’s commitment and roadmap for implementation:
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54789;
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54788;
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62681;
Twitter’s commitment and roadmap for implementation:
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/search.html?q=disinformation;
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54784;
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54780;
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62682;
Google/YouTube’s commitment and roadmap for
implementation: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54785
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54781
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62680; and
TikTok’s commitment and roadmap for implementation:
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=68231
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=68231
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the platforms’ actions in the context of medical misinformation generally track First
Amendment substantive values by prohibiting false and imminently harmful information.
In general, the platforms have undertaken extensive measures to remove imminently
harmful false medical information (e.g., posts that advocate drinking bleach to cure
COVID-19), while taking less severe measures – including labeling/countering with
counter-speech, and/or reducing the reach of, less harmful or misleading medical
information (e.g., posts that tout conspiracy theories claiming that Dr. Anthony Fauci
created the virus). Although the platforms’ efforts thus far are commendable, what is
needed at this point is for them to act much more quickly to remove harmful false and
misleading medical misinformation before it goes viral, as I discuss below.
Facebook’s Response to Medical Misinformation
Facebook has responded to the rampant spread of misinformation on its platform
in the context of the pandemic by: removing harmful false/misleading posts related to
COVID-19 – including, recently, posts by President Trump; labeling other, less harmful
posts; and issuing strong warnings to those who have shared or reacted to such posts. In
addition, Facebook has made prominently available its Coronavirus Information Center, a
repository of curated, expert information about the virus.
Facebook’s current COVID-19 misinformation policy as follows:
We remove COVID-19 related misinformation that could contribute to imminent
physical harm. We’ve removed harmful misinformation since 2018, including false
information about the measles in Samoa where it could have furthered an outbreak
and rumors about the polio vaccine in Pakistan where it risked harm to health aid
workers. Since January [2020], we’ve applied this policy to misinformation about
COVID-19 to remove posts that make false claims about cures, treatments, the
availability of essential services or the location and severity of the outbreak. We
regularly update the claims that we remove based on guidance from the WHO and
other health authorities. For example, we recently started removing claims that
physical distancing doesn’t help prevent the spread of the coronavirus. We’ve also
banned ads and commerce listings that imply a product guarantees a cure or
prevents people from contracting COVID-19. … For claims that don’t directly
result in physical harm, like conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus, we
continue to work with our network of over 55 fact-checking partners covering over
45 languages to debunk these claims…. Once a post is rated false by a fact-checker,
we reduce its distribution so fewer people see it, and we show strong warning labels
and notifications to people who still come across it, try to share it or already have.15

15
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In a surprising move in August 2020, Facebook implemented its COVID-19
misinformation policy to delete a post from President Trump’s campaign account, in which
Trump can be heard to say on video, in the context of re-opening schools, that children are
“almost immune” to the coronavirus.16 While Facebook does not frequently remove
medical misinformation, its Community Standards allow for removal of misinformation
that contributes to the risk of physical harm or imminent violence. In response to guidance
from external experts, including the World Health Organization and local health
authorities, Facebook now requires the removal of false claims about: the existence or
severity of COVID-19, how to prevent COVID-19, how COVID-19 is transmitted
(including false claims that certain racial groups are immune to the virus), cures for
COVID-19, and access to or the availability of essential services.17
Facebook has broadened its work with certified independent fact-checking
organizations18 as part of its effort to curb the spread of medical misinformation, adding
eight new dedicated fact-checking partners and “expanding [its] coverage to more than a
dozen new countries.”19 Facebook’s approach to medical misinformation generally focuses
less on removing false content and more on reducing the distribution of medical
misinformation once one of its independent fact-checking partners has rated it as false.20
To the everyday user, Facebook’s approach takes the form of warning displays on posts
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Heather Kelly, Facebook, Twitter Penalize Trump for Posts Containing Coronavirus
Misinformation, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2020),
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See Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit – Final Report, July 8, 2020.
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"To reduce the spread of misinformation and provide more reliable information to
users, we partner with independent third-party fact-checkers globally who are certified
through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)." Partnering with
Third-Party Fact-Checkers, Facebook: Journalism Project (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-factchecking/selecting-partners (last accessed July 21, 2020). IFCN verified signatories:
Verified Signatories of the IFCN Code of Principles,
https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories
(last accessed July 21, 2020).
19
Guy Rosen, An Update on Our Work to Keep People Informed and Limit
Misinformation About COVID-19, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/04/COVID-19-misinfo-update/. Facebook has also
expanded the program to Instagram and now boasts “more than 60 fact-checking partners
covering more than 50 languages around the world." Guy Rosen, Investments to Fight
Polarization, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 27, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/05/investments-to-fight-polarization/.
20
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that have been deemed false, with Facebook issuing 40 million such warnings in March
2020 and 50 million in April 2020.21 Facebook claims that when people see such warning
labels, “95% of the time they did not go on to view the original content.”22 In addition, in
response to the pandemic, Facebook has revised its content reviewer guidance to make
clear that claims such as that people of certain races or religions have the virus, created the
virus, or are spreading the virus violate Facebook’s hate speech policies.23
As part of its general counterspeech approach – of presenting users with accurate
information in response to false and misleading information, as opposed to by censoring
false information – Facebook has also taken the step of reaching out to users who have
interacted with (i.e., reacted to or commented on) medical misinformation related to
COVID-19 and connecting those users with responses to common “myths” about COVID19 that have been identified and addressed by the World Health Organization and inviting
these users to share the link with others.24 See notice below.

The most common of the myths shared on Facebook tend to suggest ineffective or
potentially harmful remedies for COVID-19, such as drinking bleach or disinfectant, or
taking unproven and potentially harmful drugs such as hydroxychloroquine.25 Other myths

21

Id.
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23
Id.
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Coronavirus Disease Advice for the Public: Mythbusters, World Health Organization,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-forpublic/myth-busters (last accessed July 21, 2020).
22
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commonly seen on the platform are those claiming that measures scientifically proven to
contain the spread of the virus – such as social distancing – are ineffective.26
In attempting to combat medical misinformation in the context of the pandemic,
Facebook has also stood up its Coronavirus Information Center.27 This feature, which
Facebook initially placed prominently at the top of the News Feed (so that it was
immediately visible upon opening the platform) serves as a rolling collection of relevant
updates about the pandemic as this information became available from both national and
global health authorities.28
Facebook’s approach to combating medical misinformation on its platform29 is
heading in the right direction but is plagued by unacceptable delays. A comprehensive
26

Some recent research has highlighted the parallels in the sharing of disinformation in
the current pandemic with the dissemination of information on supposed “cures” via
newspapers during the 1918 flu pandemic. As Elizabeth Zetland, a researcher at
MyHeritage, puts it, “You were meant to cook 12 onions, get the juice and drink it the
day afterwards, and that would protect you from the flu.” See Suyin Haynes, ‘You Must
Wash Properly.’ Newspaper Ads From the 1918 Flu Pandemic Show Some Things Never
Change, TIME (Mar. 27, 2020), available at https://time.com/5810695/spanish-flupandemic-coronavirus-ads/. Newspapers were quick to urge individuals to wear or make
their own masks; the Red Cross, in an ad placed in the Daily Gazette of Berkeley,
California, called anyone not wearing a mask “a dangerous slacker.” See id.
27
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/07/coronavirus
28
Kang-Xing Jin, “Launching the Coronavirus Information Center on Facebook”,
Keeping People Safe and Informed About the Coronavirus, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(updated July 16, 2020) https://about.fb.com/news/2020/07/coronavirus/#coronavirusinfo-center.
29
Facebook’s approach to combating medical misinformation also encompasses its
response to protests involving stay-at-home measures that authorities have deemed
necessary to curb the spread of the pandemic. Thus far, the company’s response to such
protests has been inconsistent. Facebook has removed posts organizing anti-stay-at-home
protests in California, New Jersey, and Nebraska after determining - in consultation with
state officials - that the protests violated the states’ social distancing rules. Donie
O’Sullivan and Brian Fung, Facebook Will Take Down Some, But Not All, Posts
Promoting Anti-Stay-at-Home Protests, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/20/politics/facebook-COVID-shutdownprotests/index.html. In Pennsylvania, however, an anti-lockdown group with more than
66,000 members promoted a lockdown protest scheduled to take place in Harrisburg,
without any action from Facebook. Id. Facebook’s efforts in this area are sporadic and
appear to lack a coherent strategy. In New Jersey, for example, state officials had not
specifically requested that Facebook take down content promoting anti-lockdown events,
but Facebook staff had been “communicating about the issue” with the governor’s staff.
Id. In Nebraska, Facebook contacted the governor’s office “to learn more about
Nebraska’s social distancing restrictions, and the governor’s staff provided already
8

study undertaken by the human rights group Avaaz examined the dissemination of over
100 pieces of misinformation content about the virus that were rated false and/or
misleading by independent fact-checkers and that could cause public harm.30 Avaaz’s
review found that “millions of the platform’s users are still being put at risk,” and that “the
pieces of [false and/or misleading] content [sampled by Avaaz] were shared over 1.7
million times on Facebook, and viewed an estimated 117 million times.31 For example,
according to Avaaz, “a harmful misinformation post that claimed that one way to rid the
body of the virus is to … gargle with water, salt or vinegar was shared over 31,000 times
before eventually being taken down after Avaaz flagged this content for action by
Facebook.”32Avaaz found that, notwithstanding Facebook’s policy described above, 41
percent of virus-related misinformation content remains on the platform without warning
labels, including 65% of content that had been flagged by Facebook’s own fact-checking
program.33 Beyond failing to apply warning labels to content that its fact-checking partners
deemed to be misleading, Facebook suffers from delays in the implementation of its
policies. In this age of instant digital news, unless imminently harmful medical
disinformation is rapidly curbed, it runs the risk of hastening the spread of the virus. And
yet according to Avaaz, it “can take up to 22 days for the platform to downgrade [false
and/or misleading content related to the virus] and issue warning labels.” The lag is even
more severe in the case of non-English content, where “over half (51%) of non-English
misinformation content had no warning labels.”34 Fortunately, Facebook seems willing to
change course, as evidenced by its willingness to institute a retroactive alert system,
whereby each user exposed to harmful misinformation will be notified and provided with

publicly available information about Nebraska’s 10-person limit and directed health
measures.” Id. Facebook is apparently reaching out to governments on these matters
because “[u]nless government prohibits the event during this time, we allow it to be
organized on Facebook.” Id. Yet, at least in the case of Nebraska, Facebook’s effort
seems to be a somewhat fumbling one, with Facebook employees reaching out to state
officials to learn about information that is already readily available. Facebook’s hesitance
to remove posts related to protests likely stems from a deeper worry about becoming the
online policeman on the question of the constitutional right to assemble. Id.
30
How Facebook can Flatten the Curve of the Coronavirus Infodemic, Avaaz (Apr. 15,
2020), https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/facebook_coronavirus_misinformation/. For
the full text of the report, see
https://avaazimages.avaaz.org/facebook_coronavirus_misinformation.pdf.
31
Id.
32
How Facebook can Flatten the Curve of the Coronavirus Infodemic, Avaaz (Apr. 15,
2020). “2,611 clones” of the same false post “remain on the platform with over 92,246
interactions. Most of these cloned posts have no warning labels from Facebook.”
33
Id. (emphasis in original).
34
Id.
9

accurate information. (Avaaz indicated that members of Facebook’s misinformation team
made such a commitment in a conversation with Avaaz staff in April 2020.35)
Facebook’s intent to combat medical misinformation in the context of the pandemic
is commendable, but the failures in the timely implementation of its new policies are highly
problematic given the degree of the public health risk. While Facebook cannot reasonably
be expected to identify and curb every piece of misinformation on the pandemic on its
platform, it must commit to staffing up and improving the implementation of its measures
to counter medical misinformation. Facebook’s success rate in curbing harmful
misinformation might never be perfect, but its present approach has glaring flaws that must
be remedied.
Twitter’s Response to Medical Misinformation
Twitter’s response to medical misinformation in the context of the pandemic – like
its response to false political ads, as discussed below – has been more forceful than that
undertaken by Facebook. According to this response, Twitter will remove harmful posts
containing medical misinformation that “could pose a threat to people’s health or wellbeing,” will label other posts containing medical misinformation, and will also direct users
to truthful and accurate information about the pandemic.
Under a recent update to Twitter’s rules, tweets that cause harm (including in the
context of the pandemic) will be removed. Accordingly, Twitter will remove from its
platform tweets along the lines of “social distancing is not effective” or “the news about
washing hands is propaganda.”36 An important component of Twitter’s effort includes
broadening its definition of harmful tweets, so as to more proactively target and remove
content that expressly contradicts the most up-to-date guidance from authoritative health
sources (such as the Center for Disease Control and the World Health Organization).37
Relevant portions of Twitter’s currently applicable set of rules regarding its handling of
pandemic-related misinformation is set out in the margin.38

35
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Jack Morse, Twitter Steps up Enforcement in the Face of Coronavirus Misinformation,
MASHABLE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/twitter-cracks-downcoronavirus-misinformation/.
37
@vijaya and @Derelia (Vijaya Gadde and Matt Derella), An Update on Our Continuity
Strategy During COVID-19, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/An-update-on-our-continuitystrategy-during-COVID-19.html.
38
Steps we’re taking
...
36
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Broadening our definition of harm to address content that goes directly against guidance
from authoritative sources of global and local public health information. Rather than
reports, we will enforce this in close coordination with trusted partners, including public
health authorities and governments, and continue to use and consult with information
from those sources when reviewing content.
● We’ll continue to prioritize removing content when it has a clear call to action
that could directly pose a risk to people’s health or well-being, but we want to
make it clear that we will not be able to take enforcement action on every Tweet
that contains incomplete or disputed information about COVID-19. This is not
meant to limit good faith discussion or expressing hope about ongoing studies
related to potential medical interventions that show promise.
● … We will continue to use both technology and our teams to help us identify and
stop spammy behavior and accounts.
● We may also apply the public interest notice in cases where world leaders violate
the COVID-19 guidelines.
Under this guidance, we will require people to remove tweets that include:
● Denial of global or local health authority recommendations to decrease someone’s
likelihood of exposure to COVID-19 with the intent to influence people into
acting against recommended guidance, such as: “social distancing is not
effective”, or actively encouraging people to not socially distance themselves in
areas known to be impacted by COVID-19 where such measures have been
recommended by the relevant authorities.
● Description of alleged cures for. COVID-19, which are not immediately harmful
but are known to be ineffective, are not applicable to the COVID-19 context, or
are being shared with the intent to mislead others, even if made in jest, such as
“coronavirus is not heat-resistant - walking outside is enough to disinfect you” or
“use aromatherapy and essential oils to cure COVID-19.”
● Description of harmful treatments or protection measures which are known to be
ineffective, do not apply to COVID-19, or are being shared out of context to
mislead people, even if made in jest, such as “drinking bleach and ingesting
colloidal silver will cure COVID-19.”
● Denial of established scientific facts about transmission during the incubation
period or transmission guidance from global and local health authorities, such as
“COVID-19 does not infect children because we haven’t seen any cases of
children being sick.”
● Specific claims around COVID-19 information that intends to manipulate people
into certain behavior for the gain of a third party with a call to action within the
claim, such as “coronavirus is a fraud and not real - go out and patronize your
local bar!!” or “the news about washing your hands is propaganda for soap
companies, stop washing your hands”.
● Specific and unverified claims that incite people to action and cause widespread
panic, social unrest or large-scale disorder, such as “The National Guard just
announced that no more shipments of food will be arriving for 2 months - run to
the grocery store ASAP and buy everything!”
11

Twitter states that it is working with “trusted partners” (including public health
authorities and governments) to both identify and remove harmful medical misinformation

● Specific and unverified claims made by people impersonating a government or
health official or organization such as a parody account of an Italian health
official stating that the country’s quarantine is over.
● Propagating false or misleading information around COVID-19 diagnostic criteria
or procedures such as “if you can hold your breath for 10 seconds, you do not
have coronavirus.”
● False or misleading claims on how to differentiate between COVID-19 and a
different disease, and if that information attempts to definitively diagnose
someone, such as “if you have a wet cough, it’s not coronavirus - but a dry cough
is” or “you’ll feel like you’re drowning in snot if you have coronavirus - it’s not a
normal runny nose.”
● Claims that specific groups, nationalities are never susceptible to COVID-19,
such as “people with dark skin are immune to COVID-19 due to melanin
production” or “reading the Quran will make an individual immune to COVID19.”
● Claims that specific groups, nationalities are more susceptible to COVID-19, such
as “avoid businesses owned by Chinese people as they are more likely to have
COVID-19.”
...
Instituting a global content severity triage system so we are prioritizing the potential rule
violations that present the biggest risk of harm and reducing the burden on people to
report them.
Executing daily quality assurance checks on our content enforcement processes to ensure
we’re agile in responding to this rapidly evolving, global disease outbreak.
Engaging with our partners around the world to ensure escalation paths remain open and
urgent cases can be brought to our attention.
Continuing to review the Twitter Rules in the context of COVID-19 and considering
ways in which they may need to evolve to account for new behaviors.
As we’ve said on many occasions, our approach to protecting the public conversation is
never static. That’s particularly relevant in these unprecedented times. We intend to
review our thinking daily and will ensure we’re sharing updates here on any new
clarifications to our rules or major changes to how we’re enforcing them.
Finally, we’re encouraged that our service is being used around the world to provide free,
authoritative health information, and to ensure that everyone has access to the
conversations they need to protect themselves and their families. For more, our dedicated
COVID-19 Event page has the latest facts right at the top of your timeline. @vijaya and
@Derelia (Vijaya Gadde and Matt Derella), An Update on Our Continuity Strategy
During COVID-19, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/An-update-on-our-continuitystrategy-during-COVID-19.html.
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content.39 The range of content that Twitter states it will remove is broad. Twitter is focused
on tweets that contain “denial of global or local health authority recommendations,” those
that “describe alleged cures for COVID-19, which are not immediately harmful but are
known to be ineffective,” those that “describe harmful treatments or protection measures
which are known to be ineffective,” and those that “deny established scientific facts about
transmission during the incubation period.”40
Twitter is also targeting tweets that go beyond medical misinformation and appear
to encourage societal unrest. For example, the company states that it will target and remove
tweets that contain “specific and unverified claims that incite people to action and cause
widespread panic, social unrest, or large-scale social disorder,” as well as tweets that
contain “specific and unverified claims made by people impersonating a government or
health official or organization,” such as a parody account of an Italian health official stating
that the country’s quarantine is over.41
In May 2020, Twitter announced a policy of placing warning labels on tweets
containing misinformation related to COVID-19, including tweets that are issued by world
leaders. According to Twitter’s head of site integrity Yoel Roth, such warning labels will
apply to anyone sharing misleading information that meets the requirements of Twitter’s
policy, and no exceptions will be made for the tweets of world leaders.42
Pursuant to its policy of removing COVID-19 related medical misinformation,
including from world leaders, in August 2020 Twitter removed a tweet from the Trump
Campaign in which Trump claimed that children being “almost immune” to the virus.
Twitter suspended the account’s tweeting privileges until the post was deleted, citing its
rules on COVID-19.43
In addition to removing and labeling tweets in its attempts to restrict false and
misleading medical information in the context of the pandemic, Twitter is also pursuing
other means, including by restricting the functionality of Twitter accounts that spread such
information. For example, on July 28, Twitter penalized Donald Trump, Jr., for posting
misinformation in the form of a Breitbart video showing a group of doctors making
misleading and false claims about the COVID-19 pandemic. See below. In the video, a
group of people dressed in white lab coats who call themselves “America’s Frontline
Doctors” staged a press conference in front of the U.S. Supreme Court making claims such
39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Yoel Roth (@yoyoel), TWITTER (May 11, 2020, 3:10 PM),
https://twitter.com/yoyoel/status/1259923758522855426.
43
Kelly, supra note x. Facebook deleted the same post. Id.
40
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as that hydroxychloroquine is “a cure for Covid” and “you don’t need a mask” to slow the
spread of coronavirus.44 Twitter order Trump Jr. to delete this misleading tweet, added a
note to its trending topics warning about the potential dangers of hydroxychloroquine, and
in addition, took measures to limit Trump Jr.’s account functionality for 12 hours.45
(Facebook and YouTube also removed the offending video, but not before it had been
viewed millions of times.46)

See Sam Shead, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube Pull ‘False’ Coronavirus Video After
It Goes Viral, CNBC (July 28, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/28/facebooktwitter-youtube-pull-false-coronavirus-video-after-it-goes-viral.html.
45
See Rachel Lerman, Katie Shepherd, and Taylor Telford, Twitter Penalizes Donald
Trump Jr. for Posting Hydroxychloroquine Misinformation Amid Coronavirus Pandemic,
WASH. POST (July 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/28/trumpcoronavirus-misinformation-twitter/.
46
See Shead, supra n. 45.
44
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47

In addition to implementing systems to remove false and misleading medical
information, Twitter is also prominently making available truthful and accurate
information about COVID-19 through its Know The Facts search prompt. In early 2020,
Twitter expanded its #KnowTheFacts program – which it had earlier put in place to help
the public find credible information on immunization and vaccine health – to surface and
highlight credible information on the virus and to ensure that when Twitter users access
the platform to search for information about the virus, they are first met with credible,
authoritative information from reliable sources. A further component of Twitter’s
#KnowTheFacts program limits auto-suggest results that may direct Twitter users to

47

Twitter Comms (@TwitterComms), TWITTER (July 28, 2020, 10:15 AM),
https://twitter.com/TwitterComms/status/1288115957005578246.
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misinformation on Twitter.48 And, similar to Facebook, Twitter has created a specific
webpage dedicated to providing the latest authoritative information on the pandemic. This
resource – Twitter’s “COVID-19 Event Page” – provides an aggregation of credible news
updates on the pandemic, curated with content from verified sources like The New York
Times, Associated Press, and Reuters, as well as other public health sources such as the
Center for Disease Control, which provide relevant virus-related updates.49
Twitter’s aggressive approach to medical misinformation on its platform appears
to be effective, so far. According to Twitter’s reporting on the implementation of its
policies regarding medical misinformation in the context of the pandemic, it has removed
thousands of tweets containing misleading and potentially harmful content and has
challenged over 1.5 million accounts that were targeting discussions around COVID-19
with spammy or manipulative behaviors.50
Google/YouTube’s Response to Medical Misinformation
Google’s approach to searches that seek information on COVID-19 is similarly
proactive. Whereas the company has for most of its history deferred solely to its complex
algorithms to serve up search results without human intervention, Google now has taken
the approach of having searches related to coronavirus trigger a type of “SOS alert,” and
48

See @Twitter, Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, TWITTER BLOG
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/COVID-19.html,
Launch of a new dedicated #KnowTheFacts search prompt:
As the global conversation continues around the spread of COVID-19, we want to
share the work we’re doing to surface the right information, to promote
constructive engagement, and to highlight credible information on this emerging
issue. We’ve seen tens of millions of Tweets on this topic in the past four weeks
and that trend looks set to continue. Given the rapidly evolving nature of the issue
and the growing international response, we’ve launched a new dedicated search
prompt to ensure that when you come to the service for information about the
#coronavirus, you’re met with credible, authoritative information first. In
addition, we’re halting any auto-suggest results that are likely to direct individuals
to noncredible content on Twitter. This is an expansion of our Know The Facts
prompt, which we specifically put in place for the public to find clear, credible
information on immunization and vaccination health. Id.
49
See Jack Morse, Twitter Steps up Enforcement in the Face of Coronavirus
Misinformation, MASHABLE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/twitter-cracksdown-coronavirus-misinformation/; see also COVID-19 Events Page, Twitter, available
at https://twitter.com/i/events/1219057585707315201. Most tweets and updates are from
verified news accounts such as the New York Times, Associated Press, and Reuters, as
well as other public health sources such as the CDC and similar international entities.
50
See text accompanying notes x – y.
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resulting in prominent displays of news from mainstream publications including National
Public Radio, followed by information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the
World Health Organization.”51

[Google search page in response to searching for coronavirus cure, as of July 6, 2020]

51

Mark Bergen and Garret De Vynyck, Google Scrubs Coronavirus Misinformation on
Search, YouTube, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-10/dr-google-scrubs-coronavirusmisinformation-on-search-youtube.
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In addition, YouTube has modified its Terms of Service to prohibit any content that
directly contradicts advice from the WHO.52 In an update to its monetization policy,
YouTube announced that it will prohibit videos that seek to capitalize on coronavirusrelated conspiracies, and has directed users instead to videos “debunking” the
conspiracies.53

YouTube, however, like Facebook, has run into difficulties in countering medical
misinformation on its platform, especially in regions where fact-checking is not as readily
achievable or practical as in the United States. This is partly a result of the nature of the
medium itself. YouTube videos typically involve some creative elements such that the
question of whether the resulting content is true or false becomes more complex and
nuanced. YouTube has recently adopted the same approach as Google search, providing a
banner at the top of searches for terms such as “coronavirus” or “coronavirus cure,” that
provide a link to the CDC’s official page (see below).

Coronavirus: YouTube Bans ‘Medically Unsubstantiated’ Content, BBC NEWS (Apr.
22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52388586.
53
Id.
52
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The above page provides a link to the official CDC page on COVID-19:
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II. PLATFORMS’ EFFORTS TO ADDRESS POLITICAL MISINFORMATION: MEASURES TO
COMBAT FALSE AND MISLEADING POLITICAL SPEECH AND MICROTARGETING OF POLITICAL
ADS
Introduction and Misinformation in the 2016 Election
Today’s online information ecosystem continues to be a forum for political and
election-related misinformation, as it was four years ago in the context of the 2016 election,
Misinformation and intentionally false disinformation54 on the Internet is particularly
problematic given that the Internet is a dominant (if not the dominant) source of
information in the political sphere, with two-thirds of Americans identifying internet
sources as their leading sources of information in connection with the 2016 U.S.
presidential election.55 In addition, misinformation spread via social media is much more
susceptible to being spread faster and farther than is truthful information. According to a
recent study published in Science,56 false news -- and in particular, false political news -is spread farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth -- with the top 1% of false
news cascades diffused to between 1,000 and 100,000 people (whereas the truth rarely
diffused to more than 1,000 people) and with false news diffusing faster than the truth.57
The authors of the study in Science investigated the differential diffusion of all of the
verified true and false news stories distributed on Twitter from 2006 to 2017, composed of
approximately 126,000 stories tweeted by approximately 3 million people more than 4.5
million times.58 They observed that "[f]alsehood diffused significantly farther, faster,
deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects
In this article, I will use the term “misinformation” to refer to false information
regardless of whether the speaker of that information had an intent to mislead, and I use
the term “disinformation” to refer to intentionally false information, where the speaker of
that information had an intent to mislead. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Word of the Year:
Misinformation. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2018/12/10/word-year-misinformationheres-why/.
55
See Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 3(10) (2017); PEW RES. CTR., ELECTION
2016: CAMPAIGNS AS A DIRECT SOURCE OF NEWS 28 (2016).
https://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/13/2016/07/PJ_2016.07.18_election-2016_FINAL.pdf.
56
Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News
Online, SCIENCE, 09 Mar 2018, Vol. 359, Issue 6380, pp. 1146-1151.
57
Id.
58
The authors of the study in Science classified news as “true” or “false” using
information from six independent fact-checking organizations that exhibited 95 to 98%
agreement on the classifications. Id.
54
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were more pronounced for false political news” than for false news concerning other
subjects, such as natural disasters, science, urban legends, or financial information.59
False and misleading political content on social media platforms—especially on
Facebook—played a significant role in influencing members of the electorate leading up
to the 2016 election. More than one quarter of voting age adults visited a false news
website in the final weeks of the 2016 campaign.60 Indeed, in the months leading up to the
election, the top twenty fake news stories had more “engagements” (which includes shares,
reactions, and comments) on Facebook (with 8.7 million engagements) than the twenty top
hard news stories (with 7.3 million engagements).61 In the final three months of the U.S.
presidential campaign, the top performing fake election news stories on Facebook
generated more engagements than the top stories from major news outlets such as The New
York Times, The Washington Post, Huffington Post, and NBC News,62 and material
generated by Russian operatives reached a hundred and twenty-six million American

59

Interesting, the authors further observe that "[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, robots
accelerated the spread of true and false news at the same rate, implying that false news
spreads more than the truth because humans, not robots, are more likely to spread it." Id.
But that is not to diminish the role that bots played in Russian interference in the 2016
election. Foreign interference in our 2016 presidential elections was clearly exacerbated
by the use of automation in the form of bots, trolls, and fake accounts and by the use of
microtargeted political advertisements to amplify disinformation, manipulate public
discourse, exacerbate political and social divisions, and deceive voters on a mass scale,
especially via Twitter platform, in a manner that was targeted to members of the U.S.
electorate, especially in swing states. Natasha Bertrand, Twitter Users Spreading Fake
News Targeted Swing States in the Run-Up to Election Day, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28,
2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/fake-news-and-propaganda-targeted-swingstates-before-election-2017-9. Russian bots, for example, were responsible for 30 to 40%
of election related tweets directed to the swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and
Wisconsin, as well as to the battleground states of Ohio, Missouri, Florida, North
Carolina, and Colorado, during the 2016 presidential elections. Trump won the Electoral
College because some eighty thousand votes went his way in Wisconsin, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania. See e.g., Kathleen Hall Jamieson, CYBERWAR: HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS
AND TROLLS HELPED ELECT A PRESIDENT 67 (2018).
60
See Danielle Kurtzleben, Did Fake News on Facebook Help Elect Trump? Here’s What
We Know, NPR (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601323233/6-facts-weknow-about-fake-news-in-the-2016-election.
61
Id.
62
See Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories
Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:15 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-newsoutperformed-real-news-on-facebook#.emA15rzd0.
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Facebook users.63 Twitter was a primary target of Russia’s false news and misinformation
offensives during the 2016 elections, as a St. Petersburg-based troll factory known as the
Internet Research Agency used Twitter as a vehicle to create fake accounts to exacerbate
political and social tensions in the United States and to mislead U.S. voters.64 The Internet
Research Agency controlled more than 3,000 Twitter accounts during the 2016 U.S.
elections, and another 50,000 automated accounts were connected to the Russian
government.65
Political Speech and Political Advertising on Social Media Platforms Today
Political advertising on social media platforms is big business–and, as of this
writing–big and still largely unregulated business in the United States. The total amount
spent on digital political advertising in the U.S. is expected to reach $2.9 billion in 2020
(an increase of over 100% from 2016), with Google and Facebook capturing the vast
majority of digital political advertising.66 Because of the power of such ads in influencing
our democratic processes, the method of dissemination -- including the use of
microtargeting to target specific, narrow segments of the electorate -- and the substance of
such ads -- including the issue of false and misleading information in such ads -- have been
subject to intense scrutiny, as discussed below.
Because political advertising has the potential to affect our democratic processes in
powerful ways, it has traditionally been subject to a host of government regulations,
including transparency regulations, disclosure and public file regulations, and prohibitions
on foreign participation, as I discuss below. Yet, as of this writing, such government
regulations only apply to traditional media and generally do not apply to online mediums.
This is despite the fact that Facebook’s user base of 204 million American users, for
example, is ten times larger than the subscriber base of the largest cable and satellite
providers and despite the fact that over one billion dollars was spent on online advertising
in 2016 – and many billions more will be spent on digital advertising in the context of the
2020 elections. Although the federal Honest Ads Act was introduced as an attempt to
63

See Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, THE NEW YORKER
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-helped-toswing-the-election-for-trump/.
64
See Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter is Sweeping Out Fake Accounts Like
Never Before, Putting User Growth at Risk, WASH. POST (July 6, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/06/twitter-is-sweeping-out-fakeaccounts-like-never-before-putting-user-growth-risk.
65
Id.
66
Emily Glazer, Facebook Weighs Steps to Curb Narrowly Targeted Ads, WALL STREET
J. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-discussing-potential-changesto-political-ad-policy-11574352887.
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remedy this regulatory gap and to extend this host of regulations on political advertising to
social media platforms, as of this writing, the Act has not been enacted into law. In
addition, several state legislative attempts to regulate political advertising online have been
subject to successful First Amendment challenges, as discussed below. Accordingly, the
social media giants -- Facebook, Twitter, and Google -- have been left to their own devices
to determine whether and how to regulate political advertising -- and how to regulate the
microtargeting of political ads -- on their platforms.
Below in Part A, I briefly survey the current state of the regulation of political
advertising applicable to traditional mediums of expression. In Part B, I examine the
proposed federal Honest Ads Act, as well as similar state versions of such legislation. In
Part C, I turn to the special problems of microtargeting of political advertising on social
media. I then analyze the steps that the major social media platforms have taken -- and have
declined to take -- to address the problems caused by false political speech on their forums
and by the microtargeting of political ads in particular.
A. Federal Regulation of Political Advertising Applicable to Traditional Media
Various federal statutes, Federal Election Commission rules, and Federal
Communications Commission rules currently impose transparency requirements on
political advertisements disseminated by broadcast, cable, and satellite providers, and also
impose requirements on these providers prohibiting foreign participation in U.S.
elections. First, FEC regulations impose transparency requirements on political
advertisements disseminated via non social media: Any public communication made by a
political committee — including communications that do not expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate or solicit a contribution — must
display a disclaimer. Disclaimers must also appear on political committees' internet
websites, and in certain email communications. All public communications that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, electioneering
communications, and all public communications that solicit any contribution require a
disclaimer, regardless of who has paid for them. Public communications include
electioneering communications and any other form of general public political
advertisement, including communications made using the following media: broadcast,
cable or satellite; newspaper or magazine; outdoor advertising facility; mass mailing (more
than 500 substantially similar mailings within 30 days); phone bank (more than 500
substantially similar calls within 30 days); and communications placed for a fee on another
person’s website.67
67

See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ADVERTISING AND DISCLAIMERS,
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/advertising/
(last accessed Jul. 19, 2020).
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Second, what is known as the “Foreign Participation Ban” prohibits foreign
nationals from attempting to influence elections through donations, expenditures, or other
things of value.68 Existing regulations applicable to broadcast, cable, and satellite platforms
include a broad prohibition on the involvement of foreign nationals with elections in the
United States, under which foreign nationals are prohibited from making any contribution,
donation, or expenditure in connection with any federal, state, or local election; making
any contribution or donation to any committee or organization of any national, state, or
local political party; or making any disbursement for an electioneering communication.
Third, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which applies to traditional
media, imposes disclosure and public file requirements, aimed at informing the electorate
about the source of election related advertisements, and these provisions have been upheld
by the Supreme Court.69 BCRA § 311 requires that televised “electioneering
communications” funded by anyone other than a candidate must include a statement clearly
indicating who was responsible for the ad (in the form of “[ ______ ] is responsible for the
content of this advertising”), along with the name and address (or web address) of the
person who funded the ad. In addition, BCRA requires that anyone who spent more than
$10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year file a detailed statement
with the FEC, providing his or her name, amount of expenditure, and the name of the
election to which the communication was directed, among other details. In upholding
BCRA’s disclosure and public file requirements against a First Amendment challenge by
Citizens United, the Supreme Court explained that these provisions “provid[e] the
electorate with information” and “insure that voters are fully informed about the person or
group who is speaking . . . so that people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which
they are being subjected.” The Court concluded that these requirements were a less
restrictive alternative compared to other, more extensive regulations of political speech,
that “the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before
an election,” and that this “informational interest alone is sufficient to justify application
of [the Act] to these ads.”
None of the above regulations currently apply to political advertising on social
media.
B. The Proposed Honest Ads Act

68
69

52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A).
See text accompanying notes x – y.
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As discussed above, various federal statutes and Federal Election Commission
rules
currently impose transparency requirements on political advertisements
disseminated by broadcast, cable, and satellite providers, and also impose requirements on
these providers prohibiting foreign participation in U.S. elections; yet, social media
platforms like Google, Facebook, and Twitter are currently not subject to analogous
regulations. Such social media platforms have been largely immune from Federal Election
Commission and related regulations that have long been applicable to other sources of news
and information in our political information ecosystem that mandate transparency and
accountability requirements.71
70

The Honest Ads Act, introduced in October 2017 by Senators Mark Warner (DVirginia), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minnesota) and the late John McCain (R-Arizona), seeks to
remedy this regulatory disparity. The Act attempts to address some of the problems created
by foreign interference in U.S. elections in the online arena by imposing transparency
regulations on online political advertisements and by requiring that online platforms
enforce the longstanding ban on foreign participation in United States elections.72
Although, as discussed infra, social media platforms like Twitter, Google, and Facebook
are undertaking substantial measures themselves to address such problems, such measures
may be revisited or revoked by the platforms at any time; therefore, government regulation
in the form of the Honest Ads Act is still an important tool for addressing these problems,
and indeed one that is welcomed by the platforms.73
The Honest Ads Act seeks to address problems in the online marketplace of ideas
by extending three sets of requirements that have long been imposed on communications
platforms to online platforms: (1) the expansion of disclosure requirements applicable to
political advertisements; (2) the expansion of public file requirements; and (3) the
expansion of the obligation to undertake reasonable efforts to limit foreign interference in
U.S. elections.
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See Fredreka Schouten, Federal Regulators Approve Narrow Facebook Ad Disclosure,
USA TODAY (Dec. 15, 2017, 11:42 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/14/federal-regulators-weighwhether-unmask-online-political-ad-buyers/951425001.
71
See text accompanying notes x – y.
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See S. 1989, 115th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2018).
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Both Facebook and Twitter have come out in support of the Honest Ads Act. See
Aimee Picchi, Facebook: What Is the Honest Ads Act?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-hearings-what-is-the-honest-ads-act; Twitter
Public Policy (@Policy), TWITTER (Apr. 10, 2018, 8:54 AM),
https://twitter.com/Policy/status/983734917015199744.
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First, the Honest Ads Act extends the disclosure obligations governing political
advertisements that print, broadcast, and cable advertisements must meet to online
platforms.74 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 requires that certain political ads
in print, broadcast, and cable disclose who has paid for the advertisement.75 This
requirement currently does not extend to paid Internet or digital advertisements. Under the
Honest Ads Act, the Federal Election Campaign Act’s definition of “electioneering
communication” would be expanded to include online paid political advertisements.76
Existing federal law also imposes disclosure requirements on “public communications”
that expressly advocate for a candidate’s election or defeat, are paid for or authorized by a
candidate, solicit a political contribution, or are by a political committee. The Honest Ads
Act would update the definition of “public communication” as well, to ensure that
disclosure obligations applicable to these types of advertisements extend to the online
environment.77
Second, under the Honest Ads Act, large digital platforms (those with more than
fifty million unique monthly visitors) would be required to maintain publicly available
records of political advertisements by a purchaser whose aggregate requests to purchase
political advertisements on that platform exceed $500 within the past year.78 Such records
must include a digital copy of the political advertisement, as well as a description of the
target audience, the ad rate, the name of the candidate or office that the ad was supporting,
and the contact information of the purchaser of the ad.79 Like the FCC’s broadcast file
rules, the Act would apply to ads made by, for, or about political candidates, about
elections, and about “national legislative issues of public importance.”80
Third, the Honest Ads Act would mandate that all advertising platforms—including
online platforms — make reasonable efforts to comply with the “foreign participation
ban.”81 This longstanding ban prohibits foreign nationals from attempting to influence
elections through donations, expenditures, or other things of value.82 Existing regulations
applicable to broadcast, cable, and satellite platforms include a broad prohibition on the
involvement of foreign nationals with elections in the United States, under which foreign
S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018) (“The purpose of this Act is to enhance the integrity of
American democracy and national security by improving disclosure requirements for
online political advertisements . . . .”).
75
52 U.S.C. § 30120.
76
S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018).
77
Id. § 5.
78
Id. § 8(a)(1)(A).
79
Id. § 8(a)(2).
80
Id. § 8(a)(4).
81
See id. § 9.
82
52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A).
74
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nationals are prohibited from making any contribution, donation, or expenditure in
connection with any federal, state, or local election; making any contribution or donation
to any committee or organization of any national, state, or local political party; or making
any disbursement for an electioneering communication. The Honest Ads Act would extend
these prohibitions to the online environment as well.
The Honest Ads Act was reintroduced to the 116th Congress on May 7, 2019 in the
Senate and May 8, 2019 in the House.83 For several months, it sat before the respective
Committees on Rules and Administration84 and House Administration.85 In October, the
Honest Ads Act was incorporated86 into the Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for
a Lasting Democracy Act,87 passed in the House,88 and it presently sits again before the
Rules and Administration Committee.89
State Measures to Regulate Political Ads on Social Media
In the absence of federal legislation, several states have attempted to regulate
political advertising online, but these attempts have been subject to legal challenges (which
have been successful, as of this writing). Like the Honest Ads Act, Maryland’s Online
Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act90 establishes disclosure requirements
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Zach Montellaro, The Honest Ads Act Returns, POLITICO (May 9, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-score/2019/05/09/the-honest-ads-actreturns-615586.
84
S.1356- Honest Ads Act, Actions, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1356/all-actions.
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H.R.2592- Honest Ads Act, Actions, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2592/all-actions.
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Comm. on H. Admin., Markup of H.R. 4617, Stopping Harmful Interference in
Elections for a Lasting Democracy Act, 116th Cong. (2019)
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Not to be confused with the Showing How Isolationism Effects Long-Term
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H.R.4617- SHIELD Act, Actions, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/housebill/4617/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.R.+4617%22%5D%7D&r=1&
s=1.
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for “qualifying paid digital communications disseminated through the online platform.”91
Under the Maryland Act, upon notice by the purchaser, the publisher must identify the
amount paid, and as applicable, the purchaser’s name and controlling interest.92 A number
of media outlets, including the Washington Post, brought a challenge to this law in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that the Maryland Act infringed their
First Amendment rights of free speech and free press.93 The court, while crediting
Maryland’s interest in legislating to prevent misinformation online such as was prevalent
in the 2016 election,94 nonetheless temporarily enjoined the statute’s enforcement on the
grounds that the Act was subject to strict scrutiny and therefore likely unconstitutional.
Although the court held that the state’s interest “in preventing foreign governments and
their nationals from interfering in their elections” was “compelling,”95 it nonetheless found
that the Act was both unconstitutionally over- and underinclusive: “[The Act] regulates
substantially more speech than it needs to, while, at the same time, neglecting to regulate
the primary tools that foreign operatives exploited to pernicious effect in the 2016
election.”96
Washington State has also sought to regulate social media companies’ political
advertisements. In April 2020, Washington State sued Facebook, alleging violations of the
state’s campaign finance laws. This marks the second action taken by Washington State
against Facebook for similar violations in the past two years: in December 2018, Facebook
paid a $200,000 penalty for failure to maintain legally required information under a
Washington State law governing political ads.97 Washington State requires commercial
advertisers in all mediums (including social media) to maintain records identifying the
sponsors of political ads in both state and local elections, and it further requires that these

91

Md. Code Ann. Elec. Law § 13-405(b)(1) (2018).
See Md. Code Ann. Elec. Law § 13-405(b)(6) (2018).
93
See Washington Post v. McManus, 335 F.Supp.3d 272 (D. Md. 2019) aff’d, No. 191132, 2019 WL 6647336 (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2019).
94
Washington Post, 335 F.Supp.3d at 282 (“It was in February 2018, amid the uproar
over Russian meddling in American political affairs, that Maryland legislators – noting
an absence of any federal statutory or regulatory activity aimed at thwarting foreign
interference in its elections – resolved to act and introduced the bill at issue here.”).
95
Id., at 300 (“To characterize the State of Maryland's interest in addressing this threat as
anything less than compelling would be a profound error; on the contrary, the Maryland
legislature should be commended, not criticized, for attempting to address this threat to
the fairness of its electoral process.”).
96
Id.
97
Washington State Office of the Attorney General, AG Ferguson Sues Facebook for
Repeatedly Violating Washington Campaign Finance Law (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-sues-facebook-repeatedlyviolating-washington-campaign-finance-law.
92

28

records be made readily available for public inspection.98 The present case alleges that
Facebook hosted hundreds of political ads in violation of state law since the time the
company announced it would stop accepting Washington state political ads.99 Although
Facebook does store some information about its ads in an online, publicly accessible
database (Facebook’s Ads Library, discussed infra100), according to the Washington State
action, Facebook failed to disclose additional information required under applicable state
law, such as the address of the person who sponsored the advertising, the name of that
person, the precise cost and dates of payment, and the method of payment.101
In sum, unlike political advertising on traditional media, political advertising on
social media is currently largely unregulated.

C. The Special Problems Caused by Microtargeting of Political Ads
Microtargeting of ads on social media platforms is a practice that generally allows
advertisers to limit their messaging to narrow slices or subsets of individuals, by exploiting
the vast trove of social data about individuals’ online behavior and preferences that has
been collected by social media platforms.102 Microtargeting of ads in general stands in
sharp contrast to the broadcasting of ads in mediums like major metropolitan newspapers,
radio and television, through which advertisers provide content to a large and mostly
homogenous audience (e.g., to all readers of The Washington Post). In contrast,
microtargeting delivers ad content to very specific subgroups (e.g., readers who shop at
Whole Foods who are between the ages of 25 and 49, and who have watched a certain
video on YouTube) or even to specific, listed individuals (by using tools such as
Facebook’s Custom Audiences).103 The practice of microtargeting employs and capitalizes
on the social data -- such as an individual’s likes, dislikes, interests, preferences, behaviors
and viewing and purchasing habits -- collected by social media platforms about their users
and made available to advertisers to enable advertisers to segment individuals into small
groups so as to more accurately and narrowly target advertising to them. Facebook, for
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example, reportedly tracks a list of over 1,100 attributes on each of its users spanning users’
demographic, behavioral, and interest categories.104
The practice of microtargeting enables advertisers to capitalize on the
comprehensive social data about individuals collected by social media platforms to design
and disseminate content that advertisers predict will be the most effective and relevant with
respect to the targeted segment of individuals. For example, an advertiser might limit the
scope of an ad’s distribution to single men between 25 and 35 who live in apartments and
“like” the Washington Nationals.105 While businesses derive certain benefits from the
microtargeting of ads in nonpolitical contexts, microtargeting of ads in the political context
can pose serious problems for the democratic process and for the marketplace of ideas
model that underlies our First Amendment model of freedom of speech.106 Unlike political
advertising on mass media like broadcast television or radio – in which large national or
regional audiences are exposed to the same political advertisement – by employing
narrowcasted microtargeted ads on social media, a political advertiser can craft a specific
ad to a much narrower intended audience and only that specific audience, thereby
essentially preventing others from accessing and scrutinizing the content of the ad.
As described by Facebook’s former Chief Security Officer Alex Stamos, the chief
benefit of political micro-targeting is that allows political advertisers to deploy “messages
that are extremely finely targeted to a very small number of people.”107 By microtargeting
political ads, a campaign can make different – and even contradictory – appeals to voters
in Michigan and voters in New York or Atlanta. As such, extensively deployed
microtargeting of political ads – which is by definition immune from the check of broad
public scrutiny – increases the possibility that a politician might lie with impunity. As
Stamos explains, “if you allow people to show an ad to just 100 folks and then you run tens
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of thousands of ads, it makes it extremely difficult for your political opponent and the print
media to call you out.”108 Such microtargeting of political ads also exacerbates problems
of balkanization, in which the messages that individuals are receiving are so disparate as
to dissolve the larger communities of interest that otherwise ostensibly bind the country as
a nation.109
The Internet Research Agency – the notorious agent of Russian disinformation
during the 2016 election cycle – was able to spend pennies on the dollar (or ruble)
compared to U.S. presidential campaigns by deploying powerful microtargeted political
ads on social media. With its use of microtargeted political ads, the Agency was able to
powerfully leverage its influence to interfere with U.S. elections. While the Trump and
108
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A recent study in fact showed that the very mechanism of Facebook’s ad delivery
increases partisanship. Muhammad Ali, et al, Ad Delivery Algorithms: The Hidden
Arbiters of Political Messaging, ARXIV 13 (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.04255.pdf (see “Discussion”). The authors isolated the role that
Facebook’s perception of an ad’s content plays in determining the audience that receives
it by creating a generic, non-partisan ad with a call to register to vote that linked to a
generic domain. They then “configured [their] web server to deliver a different response
for requests for these pages based on the IP address of the requestor.” If the requestor
were identified as Facebook, it would be served “a copy of the HTML from the official
Trump campaign website, the official Sanders campaign website, or a generic voting
information website.” All other requestors were simply “redirected to the generic voting
information website.” Id. at 7 (See 4.3 “Isolating role of content”). The ads therefore
appeared identical to users, but misled Facebook’s algorithm to associate them with
different political content. The authors found that even after selecting a target audience,
Facebook will prefer delivering the ad to those who it predicts will identify with its
message. “Counterintuitively, advertisers who target broad audiences may end up ceding
platforms even more influence over which users ultimately see which ads.” Id. at 1.
Beyond the “ad creation and targeting phase, where the advertiser selects their desired
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The selection is “rooted in the desire to show relevant ads to users” and, the study notes,
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advertisers aims to reach gender and race-balanced audiences.” Id. at 1-2.
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Clinton campaigns spent a combined $81 million on pre-election Facebook ads,110 for
example, the Internet Research Agency was able to sew tremendous discord by spending
only $46,000.111 This miniscule amount of spending took advantage of the powerful ability
to target custom audiences by inferring interests from social media users’ social data. The
Internet Research Agency used the microtargeting tools developed by leading technology
companies -- including Facebook's advertising customization tools -- to target specific
audiences that they believed would be particularly susceptible to false and misleading
election-related information. In particular, Russian operatives used Facebook’s Custom
Audiences112 tool to display specific ads and messages to voters who had visited the
operatives’ fake social media sites -- and used this microtargeting technique to sew division
among voters – specifically to suppress black voter turnout.113 Facebook's Custom
Audiences tool allows advertisers (including, in this case, the Russian operatives) to input
into Facebook's system a specific list of users they wish to target. While such technological
tools have long been used by corporate America to deliver advertising to target audiences,
Facebook and other social media platforms were taken by surprise by the use of such tools
for purposes of interference in the U.S. elections. As The Washington Post explains:
[Russian operatives’ microtargeted political ads] focused on such hotbutton issues as illegal immigration, African American political activism
and the rising prominence of Muslims in the United States. The Russian
operatives then used a Facebook "retargeting" tool, called Custom
Audiences, to send specific ads and messages to voters who had visited
those sites....One such ad featured photographs of an armed black woman
"dry firing" a rifle — pulling the trigger of the weapon without a bullet in
the chamber. Investigators believe the advertisement may have been
110
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designed to encourage African American militancy and, at the same time,
to stoke fears within white communities...114
Russian operatives used other Facebook tools in addition to Custom Audiences to target
groups by demographics, geography, gender, and interests. As Clinton Watts, a fellow at
the Foreign Policy Research Institute, explains, “This means that any American who
knowingly or unknowingly clicked on a Russian news site may have been targeted through
Facebook's advertising systems to become an agent of influence — a potentially
sympathetic American who could spread Russian propaganda with other Americans."115
Accordingly, "every successful click [provided the Russian operatives with] more data that
they can use to retarget [thereby speeding up] the influence dramatically."116 Targeted
Facebook users were then shown ads featuring divisive topics that the Russians wanted to
promote in their Facebook news feeds, which displayed the ads alongside messages from
friends and family members.
Professor Spencer Overton explains in greater detail how the Russian Internet
Research Agency used Facebook’s complex ad targeted tools to microtarget political ads
to African Americans in order to suppress the black vote in the 2016 election.117 Overton
explains that African American audiences accounted for over 38% of U.S.-focused ads
purchased by the Internet Research Agency, which created social media accounts that
falsely claimed they were African American-operated and urged African Americans to
“boycott the election.” Overton writes:
Facebook’s “Ad Manager” allows an advertiser to select from a series of 52,000
targeting attributes, including demographics/ethnic affinity (e.g., African
American), issue interests (e.g., “Malcolm X” or the “Civil Rights Movement”),
and Facebook engagement (e.g., liked a particular post). About 73% of the [Internet
Research Agency’s] ads used interest-based targeting, and most of the interestbased targeting focused on African American communities and interests like Martin
Luther King, Jr., Nelson Mandela, Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali. Facebook
develops these profiles by collecting vast amounts of data on its two billion users,
including posts, likes, clicks, profile information, zip codes (including user
preferences such as “likes” and comments), and by utilizing predictive modeling
techniques to make inferences. This microtargeting is also enhanced by real-time
re-targeting algorithms, a constant loop between users’ voluntary choices (e.g.,
114
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liking) and the machine’s feedback on their choices. Another targeting tool —
Facebook’s Lookalike Audience — allows advertisers to ask Facebook to create
target audiences that are demographically similar to (i.e., “look like”) another
clearly defined audience — and by doing so Facebook “clones” audiences …[In
addition,] Facebook’s Custom Audience function requires that an advertiser give
Facebook personally identifiable information (e.g., voter records, email addresses)
of the precise people the advertiser wants to target, and Facebook uses that data to
identify corresponding social media accounts.118
In short, using Facebook’s powerful microtargeting tools, Russian operatives were able to
target African-American members of our electorate, sew division, and – among other
problems – suppress the black vote.
The Internet Research Agency was not alone in its masterful deployment of
microtargeted political ads in the 2016 presidential election. The Trump Campaign, for
example, also targeted black Americans in specific neighborhoods in an effort to decrease
voter participation.119 The benefit, as then-Trump digital media director Brad Parscale
described it, was that “only the people we want to see it, see it.”120 Parscale claimed that
the use of microtargeted political ads on Facebook and Twitter enabled the Trump
Campaign to be one hundred to two hundred times more effective in targeting members of
the electorate than the Hillary for President Campaign.121 Whether or not Parscale’s
particular claim is true, research shows that political microtargeting indeed “had a
significant effect in persuading undecided voters to support Trump and in persuading
Republic supporters to turn out on polling day.”122 Specifically, researchers found that
political advertising on Facebook made voters five to ten percent more likely to vote, and
that “targeted Facebook campaigning increased the probability that a previously non-
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aligned voter would vote for Donald Trump by at least five percent” if they were a regular
Facebook user.123
Problems Caused by Microtargeting Political Ads
The microtargeting of political ads, compared to the dissemination of political ads
via traditional media outlets, is problematic for a number of reasons from a free speech
perspective – and this is not even considering the problems caused by the weaponization
of microtargeting by Russian operatives interfering in our elections, sewing division, and
suppressing the black vote. First, political ads disseminated via traditional media are
subject to a host of federal regulations requiring transparency, disclosure, limitations on
foreign interference, etc., as discussed above,124 whereas ads disseminated via social media
are not. Second, political ads disseminated via traditional media are subject to broad
exposure and broad public scrutiny – which are necessary for the truth-facilitating features
of the marketplace of ideas mechanisms to function. Microtargeted ads, on the other hand
– which are essentially the “online equivalent of whispering millions of different messages
into zillions of different ears for maximum effect and with minimum scrutiny”125 – are not
similarly subject to broad exposure or broad public scrutiny. Third, and relatedly,
microtargeted ads on social media are more likely to be susceptible to the spread of
misinformation. As politics and technology expert Dipayan Ghosh explains:
“[Microtargeting of political ads facilitates] organic shares and reshares of content pushed
by unpaid users who appreciate what they see ... and wish to spread it around their
networks. This results in free content consumption for the political campaign….[and this]
viral spread of unpaid or organic content ... further encourages the success of
misinformation campaigns.”126
In short, the microtargeting of political ads disseminated via social media is
especially pernicious because it is not subject to regulatory scrutiny, not subject to
meaningful widespread public scrutiny, and because – as discussed above – false claims in
123
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such political ads are likely to be spread farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than true
claims in political ads.127
Measures to Address False Political Advertising and Microtargeting by Social Media
Platforms
As of this writing, despite a heightened awareness of the problems caused by
microtargeted political advertising and by false political ads, such problems have yet to be
effectively addressed via regulation or legislation (at least in the United States). Instead,
political advertising on social media– and the regulation of false political speech and
microtargeting in particular – is subject to an ad hoc patchwork of voluntary, piecemeal
measures recently adopted by the social media platforms themselves. Some of the social
media platforms – notably Twitter – are adopting rigorous measures to combating such
problems, while others – notably Facebook – have adopted more of a hand-off approach,
at least with respect to political ads that constitute “direct speech by politicians.”128 Below
I examine the measures undertaken by the social media platforms to address problems
caused by the microtargeting of political ads and by false and misleading political ads.
Twitter’s Regulation of Political Ads
Of the three major social media platforms, Twitter has taken the most aggressive
stance with respect to false and misleading political ads – by banning political ads
altogether. In October 2019, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey announced that the platform would
ban all political advertising.129 The decision places Twitter in stark contrast with Facebook,
which allows political ads and exempts politicians’ political ads from its fact-checking
program130 and whose CEO Mark Zuckerberg had stridently defended his company’s
laissez-faire attitude towards political content moderation on the grounds that this approach
upholds the ideal of free expression.131 By contrast, Dorsey distinguished Twitter’s new
policy by explaining that it is not about free expression, but rather about politicians “paying
for reach.”132
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Twitter published its policy for implementing its political advertising ban on
November 11, 2019, a little less than a year before the 2020 presidential election. Twitter
defines political content as that which “references a candidate, political party, elected or
appointed government official, election, referendum, ballot measure, legislation,
regulation, directive, or judicial outcome.”133 Ads that reference the above, including by
“appeals for votes, solicitations of financial support, and advocacy for or against any of the
above-listed types of political content” are prohibited. PACs, SuperPACs, candidates,
political parties, and elected or appointed government officials are also banned from
advertising on Twitter.134 There are, however, some exemptions. Advertisers that Twitter
deems to be news publishers may reference political content so long as the reference does
not amount to advocacy.135
Twitter’s Legal, Policy and Trust & Safety Lead Vijaya Gadde also identified an
exemption for “cause-based ads”136 – ads that “educate, raise awareness, and/or call for
people to take action in connection with civic engagement, economic growth,
environmental stewardship, or social equity causes.”137 Political organizations, candidates,
and politicians may not use such ads, but other groups may.138 Among other restrictions,139
caused-based ads may not be micro-targeted. Twitter’s allowance of caused-based ads is
an apparent response to initial criticism of Twitter’s policy. Many users reacted to Twitter’s
announcement by requesting more precise definitions, including questions about what
133
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constitutes a “political” ad140 and what constitutes an “ad.”141 As yet, it is unclear. Twitter
states that for-profit organizations may place “cause ads” if they do not “have the primary
goal of driving political, judicial, legislative, or regulatory outcomes” and are “tied to the
organization’s publicly stated values, principles, and or/beliefs.”142 However, it is not clear
at this time how Twitter will interpret the “primary goal” language in its policy.143
In addition to prohibiting political ads on its platform, Twitter recently announced
measures to combat misinformation in the form of manipulated media like deepfakes and
shallow fakes.144 On February 4, 2020, Twitter announced its new policy on “synthetic and
manipulated media,”145 which provides: “You may not deceptively share synthetic or
manipulated media that are likely to cause harm. In addition, we may label Tweets
140
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containing synthetic and manipulated media to help people understand their authenticity
and to provide additional context.”146 Pursuant to this rule, Twitter will label content that
is deceptively altered or fabricated, and will remove content if it impacts public safety or
is likely to cause serious harm.147 Twitter has already shown, on five separate occasions,
146

Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy, TWITTER HELP CENTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulated-media (last visited July 19,
2020).
Id. Relevant portions of Twitter’s synthetic and manipulated media policy are as
follows: You may not deceptively promote synthetic or manipulated media that are likely
to cause harm. In addition, we may label Tweets containing synthetic and manipulated
media to help people understand their authenticity and to provide additional context.
[W]e may label Tweets that include media (videos, audio, and images) that have been
deceptively altered or fabricated. In addition, you may not share deceptively altered
media on Twitter in ways that mislead or deceive people about the media's authenticity
where threats to physical safety or other serious harm may result.….In order for content
to be labeled or removed under this policy, we must have reason to believe that media, or
the context in which media are presented, are significantly and deceptively altered or
manipulated. …In assessing whether media have been significantly and deceptively
altered or fabricated, some of the factors we consider include:
147

•
•
•

whether the content has been substantially edited in a manner that fundamentally
alters its composition, sequence, timing, or framing;
any visual or auditory information (such as new video frames, overdubbed audio,
or modified subtitles) that has been added or removed; and
whether media depicting a real person have been fabricated or simulated

We are most likely to take action (either labeling or removal…) on more significant
forms of alteration, such as wholly synthetic audio or video or content that has been
doctored (spliced and reordered, slowed down) to change its meaning. Subtler forms of
manipulated media, such as isolative editing, omission of context, or presentation with
false context, may be labeled or removed on a case-by-case basis. …
In order to determine if media have been significantly and deceptively altered or
fabricated, we may use our own technology or receive reports through partnerships with
third parties. In situations where we are unable to reliably determine if media have been
altered or fabricated, we may not take action to label or remove them.
…We also consider whether the context in which media are shared could result in
confusion or misunderstanding or suggests a deliberate intent to deceive people about the
nature or origin of the content, for example by falsely claiming that it depicts reality. We
assess the context provided alongside media to see whether it makes clear that the media
have been altered or fabricated. Some of the types of context we assess in order to make
this determination include:
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that it will place warnings on posts from the President that violate its policies, such as its
policies on abusive behavior and on misinformation, including manipulated media.148
•
•
•
•

The text of the Tweet accompanying or within media
Metadata associated with media
Information on the profile of the account sharing media
Websites linked in the Tweet, or in the profile of the account sharing media

…
Tweets that share synthetic and manipulated media are subject to removal under this
policy if they are likely to cause serious harm. Some specific harms we consider include:
•
•
•

Threats to the physical safety of a person or group
Risk of mass violence or widespread civil unrest
Threats to the privacy or ability of a person or group to freely express themselves
or participate in civic events…
We also consider the time frame within which the content may be likely to impact public
safety or cause serious harm, and are more likely to remove content under this policy if
we find that immediate harms are likely to result from the content’s presence on
Twitter….In most cases, if we have reason to believe that media shared in a Tweet have
been significantly and deceptively altered or fabricated, we will provide additional
context on Tweets sharing the media where they appear on Twitter. This means we may:
• Apply a label to the content where it appears in the Twitter product;
• Show a warning to people before they share or like the content;
• Reduce the visibility of the content on Twitter and/or prevent it from being
recommended; and/or
• Provide a link to additional explanations or clarifications, such as in a Twitter
Moment or landing page.
In most cases, we will take all of the above actions on Tweets we label.
Media that meet all three of the criteria defined above—i.e. that are synthetic or
manipulated, shared in a deceptive manner, and is likely to cause harm—may not be
shared on Twitter and are subject to removal. Accounts engaging in repeated or severe
violations of this policy may be permanently suspended.
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulatedmedia#:~:text=Overview,are%20likely%20to%20cause%20harm.&text=In%20addition
%2C%20you%20may%20not,other%20serious%20harm%20may%20result.
148
Twitter’s first warning labels on Tweets from the President involved unsubstantiated
claims about mail-in ballots being fraudulent, glorifying violence/use of force, and a
manipulated video (discussed further below). Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter’s Decision to
Label Trump’s Tweets Was Two Years in the Making, WASH. POST (May 29, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/29/inside-twitter-trump-label/. As
of the time of this writing, Twitter most recently affixed a warning label to a second
Tweet from the President promoting use of force against protestors, citing its policy
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In the first case of Twitter applying its new policy on disinformation through
deliberately altered content, Twitter labeled as “manipulated media” an edited video
featuring presidential candidate Joe Biden in which Biden appeared to be endorsing
President Trump for re-election in 2020, which was tweeted by White House social media
director Dan Scavino and retweeted by the President.149 The video had been edited so as
to mislead viewers into believing that Biden was actually endorsing Trump.

In short, Twitter’s absolute ban on political ads and its restrictions on manipulated
media constitute strong and likely effective measures toward addressing the problems of
false and misleading political speech. Some skeptics of the ban, however, have pointed
out that the ban will not affect “organic” content or messages from politicians that are
shared or retweeted by supporters, and that it could encourage the use of “bots” or paid

regarding “the presence of a threat of harm against an identifiable group.” Rachel
Lerman, Twitter Slaps Another Warning Label on Trump Tweet About Force, Wash. Po
(June 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/23/twitter-slapsanother-warning-label-trump-tweet-about-force/. Facebook left the post up without a
warning. Id.
149
See Ivan Mehta, Trump’s Retweet with doctored Biden Video Earns Twitter’s First
‘Manipulated Media’ Label, THE NEXT WEB (March 9, 2020),
https://thenextweb.com/twitter/2020/03/09/trumps-tweet-with-doctored-biden-videoearns-twitters-first-manipulated-media-label/.
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users to amplify the tweets.150 In addition, it remains to be seen whether Twitter’s carveout for caused-based ads will provide sufficient opportunities for important speech on
topics of civic and social activism.
Facebook’s Regulation of Falsity in Political Ads
Facebook is taking a number of steps to combat misinformation in general on its
platform.151 The company has adopted extensive measure to combat publicly-available
misinformation, including by partnering with independent third-party fact checkers to
evaluate posts, providing counterspeech in the form of “Related Articles”/“Additional
Reporting on This” on topics similar to false or misleading posts, and limiting the
distribution of posts from content providers who repeatedly share false news and
eliminating their ability to profit.152 These extensive measures to combat misinformation
and false content on Facebook are applicable to political content and political ads, but are
not applicable to posts that are considered “direct speech by a politician.” Thus, under
Facebook’s currently applicable fact-checking policies, political speech and the content of
political ads are subject to fact-checking – except if such content constitutes “direct speech
by a politician.” This exception for politicians’ content has come under substantial scrutiny
in recent months, especially given the highly controversial posts of President Trump.
Before examining this controversial exception to Facebook’s general fact-checking policy
for public posts on its platform, I first examine the company’s generally-applicable policy
itself.
Facebook’s General Fact-Checking Policy for Publicly-Available Posts – Excluding the
Posts of Politicians
Facebook is continuing to expand the partnership that it began in December 2016
with fact-checkers to evaluate publicly-available content posted on its platform.153
Through its fact-checking initiatives, Facebook is working with select independent thirdparty fact checkers, which are certified through the non-partisan International Fact-

150

See https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/technology/twitter-exempts-somecause-based-messages-from-political-ad-ban/
https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/15/twitter-world-leaders-break-rules/
See Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: What’s Facebook’s Strategy for Stopping False
News?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 23, 2018),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/hard-questions-false-news.
152
See Hunt Allcott et al., Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social Media
app. at 4 (Stan. Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 18-029, 2018),
http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fake-news-trends-appx.pdf (listing in Table
1 all of Facebook’s efforts to combat false news).
153
See Lyons, supra note x.
151
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Checking Network.154 In the United States, the certified fact-checking organizations with
whom Facebook works are the Associated Press, factcheck.org, Lead Stories, Check Your
Fact, Science Feedback, and PolitiFact.155 (Notably, Facebook had added The Weekly
Standard to these ranks for a period of time in an attempt to respond to critics who claimed
that its fact-checking program was politically biased, but this publication is now defunct.)
Facebook has expanded its fact-checking initiative to include the fact checking of
all public, newsworthy Facebook posts, including links, articles, photos, and videos.156 The
fact-checking process on Facebook also applies to political advertisements -- except if
those advertisements (or other posts) constitute "direct speech made by an elected
official."157 As Facebook explains, “Posts and ads from politicians are generally not
subjected to fact-checking [including] politicians at every level. This means candidates
running for office, current office holders - and, by extension, many of their cabinet
appointees - along with political parties and their leaders.” This conspicuous exception to
Facebook's fact-checking process has major ramifications for the political process, and has
subjected Facebook to substantial criticism in recent months. Below, I first examine
Facebook's fact-checking process generally, and then turn to the exception to this process
for posts made by elected officials (including their political advertisements).
Facebook's fact-checking process can be initiated by Facebook users by flagging a
post as being potentially false. Subject to the exception for direct speech by politicians, any
public, newsworthy post (including text, photos, and videos) can be flagged for factchecking, either by a user, by an outside journalist, or – as is most commonly the case – by
Facebook's machine learning algorithms. For a user to flag a post as potentially false, a

154

See id. and https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories

155

See Mike Ananny, Checking in with the Facebook Fact-Checking Partnership,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/facebook-factchecking-partnerships.php; see also How Are Third-Party Fact-Checkers Selected?,
FACEBOOK HELP CENT.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1599660546745980?helpref=faq_content (last visited
Sept. 29, 2018); Fact-Checking on Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK
HELP CENT., https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed
July 19, 2020).
156
See Antonia Woodford, Expanding Fact-Checking to Photos and Videos, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Sept. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/09/expanding-factchecking.
157
“If a claim is made directly by a politician on their Page, in an ad or on their website,
it is considered direct speech and ineligible for our third party fact checking program —
even if the substance of that claim has been debunked elsewhere.” Fact-Checking on
Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK HELP CENT.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed July 19,
2020).
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user clicks “. . .” next to the post he or she wishes to flag as false, then clicks “Report post,”
then clicks “It’s a false news story,” then clicks “Mark this post as false news.”158
Once a post is flagged by a user as a potential false news story, it is submitted for
evaluation to a third-party independent fact-checker.159 While the process of evaluating
posts in the past was triggered only by user flagging, Facebook now incorporates other
ways of triggering such evaluation, including by providing its independent fact checkers
with the authority to proactively identify posts to review160 as well as by using machine
learning to identify potentially false posts.161 For each piece of content up for review, a
fact checker has the option of providing one of eight different ratings: false, mixture, false
headline, true, not eligible (if, for example, the post is not verifiable, opinion, etc.), satire,
opinion, or prank generator.162
Once a third-party fact-checker has determined that a post is false, Facebook then
initiates several steps. First, Facebook deprioritizes false posts in users’ News Feeds, i.e.,
the constantly updating list of stories in the middle of a user’s home page (including status
updates, photos, videos, links, app activity, and likes)—such that future views of each false
post will be reduced by an average of eighty percent.163 Second, Facebook commissions a
fact-checker to write a “Related Article” or “Additional Reporting on This” setting forth
truthful information about the subject of the false post and the reasons why the fact-checker
rated the post as false.164 Such content is then displayed in conjunction with the false post
158

See How Do I Mark a Post as False News?, FACEBOOK HELP CENT.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/572838089565953?helpref=faq_content (last visited
Sept. 29, 2018). Alternatively, a user can click “. . .” next to a post, then click “Find
Support or Report Post,” then select “False News.”
159
See Lyons, supra note x (“[W]hen people on Facebook submit feedback about a story
being false or comment on an article expressing disbelief, these are signals that a story
should be reviewed.”).
160
See id. (“Independent third-party fact-checkers review the stories, rate their accuracy,
and write an article explaining the facts behind their rating.”).
161
See Dan Zigmond, Machine Learning, Fact-Checkers and the Fight Against False
News, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 8, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/04/insidefeed-misinformation-zigmond.
162
Fact-Checking on Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK HELP CENT.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed July 19,
2020).
163
See id.; see also Tessa Lyons, Increasing Our Efforts to Fight False News, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (June 21, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/increasing-ourefforts-to-fight-false-news/.
164
See Tessa Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags With Related Articles, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Dec. 20, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/news-feed-fyiupdates-in-our-fight-against-misinformation.
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on the same subject.165 While Facebook formerly flagged false news sites with a
“Disputed” flag, the company changed its approach in response to research suggesting that
such flags may actually entrench beliefs in the disputed posts. Facebook now provides
“Related Articles”/“Additional Reporting on This” in conjunction with false news stories
(which apparently does not result in similar entrenchment).166 In addition, users who
attempt to share the false post will be notified that the post has been disputed and will be
informed of the availability of a “Related Article”/“Additional Reporting on This,” as will
users who earlier shared the false post,167 as in the example below (setting forth Facebook
and Instagram’s flags).168

See id.; see also Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Fell for Facebook Fake News. Here’s Why
Millions of You Did Too., WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/18/i-fell-facebook-fake-newsheres-why-millions-you-did-too/ (describing steps undertaken by Facebook to respond to
fake video, including posting “Additional Reporting on This,” with links to reports from
fact-checking organizations); supra Lyons, note 14; Sara Su, New Test with Related
Articles, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/news-feed-fyi-new-test-with-related-articles.
166
See Lyons, supra note x (explaining that “[a]cademic research on correcting
misinformation has shown that putting a strong image, like a red flag, next to an article
may actually entrench deeply held beliefs . . . [but that] Related Articles, by contrast, are
simply designed to give more context, which our research has shown is a more effective
way to help people get to the facts. . . . [W]e’ve found that when we show Related
Articles next to a false news story, it leads to fewer shares than when the Disputed Flag is
shown.”).
167
See Lyons, supra note x.
168
Elle Hunt, ‘Disputed by Multiple Fact-Checkers’: Facebook Rolls Out New Alert to
Combat Fake News, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/22/facebook-fact-checking-tool-fakenews.
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In addition, As Facebook explains: "When fact-checkers write articles with more
information about a story, you'll see them in Related Articles immediately below the story
in your News Feed."169 Facebook also provides its users who are about to share posts that
have been debunked by a fact-checker by alerting them to additional reporting. Facebook
users are provided with the following notice, in an attempt to keep such false posts from
going viral: "Before you share this content, you might want to know that there's additional
reporting on this from [list of fact-checkers that have debunked the post]."170 As an
169

How is Facebook Addressing False News Through Third-Party Fact-Checkers,
FACEBOOK HELP CENT., https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536 (last visited
July 21, 2020).
170
See Fact-Checking on Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK BUS.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed Dec. 12,
2019).
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example, Facebook users who attempted to share the infamous video of Nancy Pelosi,
which was doctored to make it appear that she was drunk and slurring her words, were
alerted to the fabrication.171 In addition, Facebook will now post more prominent factchecking labels as interstitials warnings atop photos and videos on Facebook (and
Instagram) that were fact-checked as false, as in the examples below.
Third, content providers—i.e., Facebook pages and domains—that repeatedly
publish and/or share false posts will have their ability to monetize and advertise reduced
and ultimately disabled by Facebook unless and until they issue corrections or successfully
dispute fact-checkers’ determination that their posts are false.172
Facebook's Policies Regarding False Political Ads
With respect to false political ads, Facebook's policy is complex. Although
Facebook has implemented extensive measures with respect to false posts generally
(described above), this false news policy does not apply to “direct speech” by politicians.
Accordingly, Facebook’s general false news policy -- composed of the fact-checking
process described above -- has an exception for “direct speech” by politicians, such that
direct speech by politicians is not run through Facebook's external fact checking process.
Facebook provides the following justification for this exception to its fact-checking policy:
We rely on third-party fact-checkers to help reduce the spread of false news and
other types of viral misinformation, like memes or manipulated photos and videos.
We don’t believe, however, that it’s an appropriate role for us to referee political
debates and prevent a politician’s speech from reaching its audience and being
subject to public debate and scrutiny. ...This means that we will not send organic
content or ads from politicians to our third-party fact-checking partners for
review.173
171

Cecilia Kang, Nancy Pelosi Criticizes Facebook for Handling of Altered Videos, N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/technology/facebookpelosi-video (“People who see the video in feed, try to share it from feed, or already
shared it are alerted that it’s false.”).
172
See Satwik Shukla & Tessa Lyons, Blocking Ads from Pages That Repeatedly Share
False News, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/08/blocking-ads-from-pages-that-repeatedly-sharefalse-news; https://www.facebook.com/business/help/182222309230722
173
Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sep.
24, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/. Facebook
will, however, subject the posts of political action committees and political advocacy
groups to its fact-checking process. Facebook has explained that while it will not fact
check political ads from candidates, it does evaluate the accuracy of political ads from
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Posts and ads that constitute “direct speech” from current “politicians” at any/every
level and their appointees -- i.e., the politician’s own claim or statement -- are not
subjected to fact-checking -- even if the substance of the claim has been debunked
elsewhere.174
Facebook’s decision not to submit direct speech from current politicians to factchecking is apparently grounded in the belief that such political speech is already subject
to sufficient scrutiny among the polity and the free press and should not be subject to further
scrutiny by Facebook’s fact-checkers. Facebook further justifies its policies as follows:
"In a democracy, people should decide what is credible, not tech companies...That’s why–
like other internet platforms and broadcasters– we don’t fact check ads from politicians."175
The company further justifies its decision by adverting to the importance of political ads
to challengers and local candidates: "Given the sensitivity around political ads, we have
considered whether we should ban them altogether...But political ads are important for
local candidates, up-and-coming challengers, and advocacy groups that use our platform
to reach voters and their communities.”176
As a result, political speech and political ads made by politicians themselves – posts
and campaign ads by politicians – operate in a separate system on Facebook. While
ordinary users who publicly post false content are subject to a range of actions and
consequences –including possibly outright ban from Facebook177 – elected officials are
exempt from such consequences.
Facebook's decision not to screen for or remove false ads by politicians came into
sharp focus in October 2019, when President Donald Trump’s reelection campaign began
running an ad that was proven to be false178 about former Vice President Joe Biden on

political advocacy groups or political action committees. See David Klepper, Facebook
Clarifies Zuckerberg Remarks on False Political Ads, AP NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://apnews.com/64fe06acd28145f5913d6f815bec36a2.
174
Fact-Checking on Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK BUS.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed Dec. 12,
2019) (emphasis added).
175
David Klepper, Facebook Clarifies Zuckerberg Remarks on False Political Ads, AP
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019), https://apnews.com/64fe06acd28145f5913d6f815bec36a2.
176
David Klepper, Facebook Clarifies Zuckerberg Remarks on False Political Ads, AP
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019), https://apnews.com/64fe06acd28145f5913d6f815bec36a2.
177
See text accompanying notes x – y.
178
Amy Sherman, Donald Trump Ad Misleads About Joe Biden, Ukraine, and the
Prosecutor, POLITIFACT (Oct. 11, 2019),
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Facebook. The Trump Campaign released a 30-second video ad accusing Biden of
promising Ukraine money in exchange for firing a prosecutor investigating a company with
ties to Biden’s son, Hunter Biden.179 The video ad falsely claimed that Joe Biden offered
Ukraine $1 billion in aid if Ukraine pushed out the official investigating a company tied to
Hunter Biden. The Biden campaign asked Facebook to take down the ad, but Facebook
refused. In justifying its refusal, Facebook’s head of global elections policy Katie Harbath
explained: “Our approach is grounded in Facebook’s fundamental belief in free expression,
respect for the democratic process, and the belief that, in mature democracies with a free
press, political speech is already arguably the most scrutinized speech there is.”
Accordingly, the false Trump Campaign ad on Biden remained available on Facebook,
garnering at least 4.6 million views.180
Former presidential candidate Senator Elizabeth Warren -- who has a history of
locking horns with Facebook and with big tech in general181 -- took particular aim at
Facebook’s policy towards political ads by placing an intentionally false ad on the platform
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2019/oct/11/donald-trump/trump-ad-misleadsabout-biden-ukraine-and-prosecut/.
179
Michael M. Grynbaum & Tiffany Hsu, CNN Rejects 2 Trump Campaign Ads, Citing
Inaccuracies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/business/media/cnn-trump-campaign-ad.html.
180
Jeremy B. Merrill, While Everyone Was Looking at Facebook, Trump’s False Biden
Ad Appeared More Often on YouTube, QUARTZ (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://qz.com/1739780/trumps-biden-ad-appeared-more-often-on-youtube-than-onfacebook/.
181
See Elizabeth Warren, (@TeamWarren), Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech,
MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-upbig-tech-9ad9e0da324c. After announcing her ambition to break up big tech companies,
Warren took out ads on Facebook that denounced Facebook itself as well as Amazon and
Google for their “vast power over our economy and our democracy.” Cristiano Lima,
Facebook Backtracks After Removing Warren Ads Calling for Facebook Breakup,
POLITICO (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/11/facebookremoves-elizabeth-warren-ads-1216757. Facebook initially removed the ads, apparently
because they contained an unauthorized reproduction of Facebook’s logo, but soon after,
the company reversed course and restored them “in the interest of allowing robust
debate.” Isaac Stanley-Becker and Tony Romm, Facebook Deletes, and Then Restores,
Elizabeth Warren’s Ads Criticizing the Platform, Drawing Her Rebuke, WASH. POST
(Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/12/facebook-deletesthen-restores-elizabeth-warrens-ads-criticizing-platform-drawing-her-rebuke/; Elizabeth
Warren, Elizabeth’s Plan: Break up the Big Tech Companies, FACEBOOK (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.facebook.com/ElizabethWarren/videos/396777104233421/. Warren
meanwhile warned of the danger of a “social media marketplace” that is “dominated by a
single censor.” Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren), TWITTER (Mar. 11, 2019, 7:59 PM),
https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1105256905058979841.
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in October 2019. Warren’s ad declared that “Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook just endorsed
Donald Trump for re-election.”182 She explained that the ad was a test to see “just how far”
Facebook’s policy went and accused Facebook of becoming a “disinformation-for-profit
machine.”183 Adhering to its policy of refusing to fact-check direct speech by politicians,
Facebook declined to remove Warren’s intentionally (and provocatively) false ad, stating
“if Senator Warren wants to say things she knows to be untrue, we believe Facebook should
not be in the position of censoring that speech.”184
At least one of Facebook’s fact-checking partners expressed dissatisfaction with
the company’s policy of refusing to fact-check direct speech by politicians. Lead Stories –
one of Facebook’s six fact-checking organizations in the United States – has argued that
Facebook should modify its policy and should scrutinize ads from politicians and
recommended that such a fact-checking process should be reviewed by a new nonpartisan
blue-ribbon panel.185 This fact-checking partner reportedly proposed these changes to the
policy at Facebook’s November 2019 fact-checking partner summit. Alan Duke, Lead
Stories’ editor-in chief, contended that there is “an urgent need for a fair method to identify
egregiously false political ads in 2020” because “too many people are too fast to fall for
disinformation.”186 However, Facebook declined to make any changes in its fact-checking
policy in response.
In addition, Facebook employees recently rose up in strong opposition to
Facebook’s policy exempting politicians’ (and especially President Trump’s) posts from
fact-checking (and from other of the company’s content policies as well, including those
prohibiting threats of imminent violence). The particular flashpoint most recently at issue
involved violent speech, not misinformation, in the form of Donald Trump’s May 2020
post following the murder of George Floyd and the ensuing demonstrations. Trump

Brian Fung, Elizabeth Warren Targets Facebook’s Ad Policy -- with a Facebook Ad,
CNN (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/11/politics/elizabeth-warrenfacebook-ad/index.html.
183
Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2019, 10:01 AM),
https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1183019880867680256.
184
Brian Fung, Elizabeth Warren Targets Facebook’s Ad Policy -- with a Facebook Ad,
CNN (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/11/politics/elizabeth-warrenfacebook-ad/index.html.
185
See Donie O’Sullivan, A Facebook Fact-Checker Will Propose a Possible Solution to
the Company’s False Ad Debacle, CNN (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/31/tech/facebook-fact-checking-political-ads/index.html.
186
Donie O’Sullivan, A Facebook Fact-Checker Will Propose a Possible Solution to the
Company’s False Ad Debacle, CNN (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/31/tech/facebook-fact-checking-political-ads/index.html.
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threatened to deploy the military in Minneapolis to “bring the City under control” and
infamously stated “when the looting starts, the shooting starts.”187

President Trump made this post across several platforms. While Twitter appended a notice
to the President’s post explaining that the post violated the platform’s rules against
glorifying violence and requiring users to click through the notice to view the tweet (see
below),

187

Megan Rose Dickey and Taylor Hatmaker, Facebook Employees Stage Virtual
Walkout in Protest of Company’s Stance on Trump Posts, TECHCRUNCH (June 1, 2020),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/01/facebook-employees-stage-virtual-walkout-in-protestof-companys-stance-on-trump-posts/ (screenshot included).
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Facebook took no action.188 Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg explained that he was
personally appalled by the President’s tweet, but felt that Facebook’s institutional role was
to “enable as much expression as possible unless it will cause imminent risk of specific
harms or dangers spelled out in [Facebook’s] clear policies.” Zuckerberg explained further
that “we read it as a warning about state action, and we think people need to know if the
government is planning to deploy force.”189 Some of Facebook’s employees, however,
were extremely dissatisfied by the company’s response, resulting in “intense debate” on
Facebook’s internal employee messaging system about the company’s laissez-faire
policies regarding politicians’ posts.190 In response, Zuckerberg hosted an internal townhall to explain his and the company’s rationale for inaction.191 Facebook ultimately
retreated from its non-interventionist stance towards Donald Trump and his campaign, at
least with respect to its hate speech content regulation, as it removed a Trump Campaign
page ad because of its use of a symbol of hate.192 However, many companies felt Facebook
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still had not gone far enough, and joined a growing advertising boycott to pressure the
platform to take more aggressive action against the hate speech and misinformation being
spread by political figures such as President Trump.193 Facebook responded by announcing
that it would remove posts from political leaders that incited violence or attempted to
suppress voting, and affix labels on posts violating its hate speech prohibitions.194
Facebook’s decision to exempt speech by politicians from its fact-checking and
other content regulation policies also drew sharp criticism recently from civil rights
experts, who conducted an extensive, independent two-year civil rights audit of Facebook’s
content regulation policies and their implementation.195 The experts’ concerns were
magnified by Facebook’s response to President Trump’s posts regarding recent civil rights
protests and mail-in ballots in the context of the pandemic. The civil rights experts
expressed strong criticisms of the company’s policies and exemption of Trump’s posts
from its content regulation policies and voiced particular concern about the ramifications
of this exemption for our political process:
We have grave concerns that the combination of the company’s decision to
exempt politicians from fact-checking and the precedents set by its recent
gender identity or immigration status are a threat to the physical safety, health or survival
of others” are now prohibited when they were not before, and Facebook also intends to
“better protect immigrants, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from ads suggesting
these groups are inferior or expressing contempt, dismissal or disgust directed at them.”
Id.
193
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Twitch recently suspended President Trump’s account and Reddit closed a longcontroversial forum named after the President (this same forum helped to popularize the
dangerous Pizzagate false conspiracy theory). Reddit’s action may have been in response
to “employee” concerns as well, as it came after an open letter written by hundreds of
volunteer moderators chastised Reddit’s leadership for the proliferation of hateful speech,
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decisions on President Trump’s posts, leaves the door open for the platform
to be used by other politicians to interfere with voting. If politicians are free
to mislead people about official voting methods (by labeling ballots illegal
or making other misleading statements that go unchecked, for example) and
are allowed to use not-so-subtle dog whistles with impunity to incite
violence against groups advocating for racial justice, this does not bode well
for the hostile voting environment that can be facilitated by Facebook in the
United States. We are concerned that politicians, and any other user for that
matter, will capitalize on the policy gaps made apparent by the president’s
posts and target particular communities to suppress the votes of groups
based on their race or other characteristics. With only months left before a
major election, this is deeply troublesome as misinformation, sowing racial
division and calls for violence near elections can do great damage to our
democracy.196
Facebook’s Refusal to Regulate the Microtargeting of Political Ads
Facebook, as discussed above, has been the primary social media platform
facilitating the microtargeting of political ads to members of the public, allowing political
advertisers to have access to the vast trove of social data that it collects on its users, to serve
up ads to users with great precision and with no public scrutiny. In addition to Facebook’s
reticence to adopt measures applicable to false political ads by politicians, the company
has also been flatly unwilling to regulate or modify its practice of allowing for the
microtargeting of political ads on its platform, despite calls for the company to do so.
Although Facebook as of late 2019 was reportedly considering increasing the minimum
number of people who can be targeted in political ads on its platform from 100 to a few
thousand, as of this date, Facebook has not made any changes to its policy allowing for the
microtargeting of political ads.197
Facebook's Transparency and Disclosure Requirements Regarding Political/Electioneering
Advertisements
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Facebook has recently implemented a Political Advertising Policy that requires,
first, that every election-related and issue advertisement made available on Facebook to
users in the United States be clearly labeled as a “Political Ad” and include a “Paid for by”
disclosure, with the name of the individual or organization who paid for the advertisement
at the top of the advertisement.198 Second, under the Policy, Facebook has committed to
collecting and maintaining a publicly available archive of political advertisements as part
of its Ad Library, which provides information regarding the campaign budget associated
with each individual ad and how many people saw it, including their age, location, and
gender.199 See example below.

And Facebook has recently updated its Ad Library’s functionality in an effort to increase
transparency and provide more useful data to researchers, advocates, and the public
generally – including by permitting users to search for and filter ads based on the estimated
audience size – which enable researchers to identify and study micro-targeted ads.200
Finally, under the Policy, Facebook will prohibit foreign entities from purchasing political
ads directed at U.S. audiences. Facebook implements this last prohibition by mailing to
prospective political advertisers a postcard to a U.S. address in order to verify U.S.
residency. If a prospective purchaser of a political ad is not verified under this process, it
will not be able to purchase a political ad on Facebook. Commenting on the recently
198
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implemented Political Advertising Policy, Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg explained,
“These changes won’t fix everything, but they will make it a lot harder for anyone to do
what the Russians did during the 2016 election and use fake accounts and pages to run
ads.”201 Facebook’s recently implemented measures imposing disclosure requirements on
political ads and limiting foreign entities from purchasing political ads go beyond those
that are encompassed in the proposed Honest Ads Act, discussed above, and may at least
be moderately successful in preventing the type of foreign interference in U.S. elections
that occurred in 2016.
Google’s Measures to Address Microtargeting of Political Ads
Google recently amended its rules governing the practice of microtargeting of
political advertisements. While Google maintains that it has never offered “granular
microtargeting” of election ads, in November 2019, Google officially amended its rules to
restrict microtargeting so that political advertisers can only target ads based on three
characteristics: an individual’s age, gender, and general location (defined by postal
code).202 Political advertisers can also use contextual targeting, which enables them to
serve users with ads according to the content that users are accessing.203 Google claims this
approach aligns it with industry practice in television, radio and print media.204 Google’s
policy on microtargeting took effect in the European Union at the end of 2019, and became
effective worldwide (including in the United States) in January 2020.205
201
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Accordingly, under Google’s rules, only the following characteristics may be used
to target election ads: geographic location (but not radius around a location), age, gender,
and contextual targeting options such as ad placements, topics, keywords against sites,
apps, pages and videos. All other types of targeting are not allowed for use in election ads,
including the use of Google’s powerful Audience Targeting products, 206 Remarketing,207
Customer Match,208 and Geographic Radius Targeting.209
Google’s microtargeting
policy applies to ads shown to users of Google’s search engine and YouTube, as well as
display advertisements sold by Google that appear on other websites. In an email to
political campaigns, Google outlined these new rules, explaining that election ads will no
longer be allowed to target what are called “affinity audiences” that look like other groups
that campaigns might want to target. Further, political campaigns can no longer upload
their own lists of people to whom to show ads. In addition, Google will prohibit what is
known as “remarketing,” the process of serving ads to people who have previously taken
an action like visiting a campaign’s website.
Google’s microtargeting policy prevents political advertisers from taking
advantage of some of Google’s most sophisticated targeting tools, upon which it has built
its dominant market position.210 The most granular of those targeting tools are “custom
affinity” audiences, an offering that has allowed advertisers to create tailor-made audiences
by targeting individual interests and lifestyles as defined by keyword phrases. Google’s
sophisticated targeting tools also have allowed advertisers to target or exclude according
to demographic data such as age, gender, household income, homeownership, and the
like.211 General advertisers may also target users who have previously interacted with their
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site212 or by submitting previously collected customer data to re-engage with the same
group or expand to similar audiences.213 These sophisticated targeting tools are now
unavailable to political advertisers.
One of the greatest challenges Google faces in implementing its policy restricting
the use of microtargeting by political advertisers is how to meaningfully and accurately
define political/election advertising. With respect to the United States, Google currently
defines election ads as those that feature:
A current officeholder or candidate for an elected federal office (including federal
offices such as that of the President or Vice President of the United States, members
of the United States House of Representatives or United States Senate).
● A current officeholder or candidate for a state-level elected office, such as
Governor, Secretary of State, or member of a state legislature.
● A federal or state level political party.
● A state-level ballot measure, initiative, or proposition that has qualified for the
ballot in its state.214
●

Yet, few election ads as they are popularly understood are likely to be so specific. For
example, “issue ads” funded by Super-PACs may not specifically “advocate the election
or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate,”215 yet such outside spending makes up
the vast majority of political advertising.216 Thus, Google’s definition of election ads may
turn out to be substantially underinclusive and ineffective.
Google has also implemented a host of procedural requirements for political
advertisers. Advertisers who wish to purchase and run election ads217 or use political
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affiliation in personalized advertising218 in the United States must go through a verification
process, which is required for all ad formats/extensions, and all personalized ads features.
Political advertisers must provide a Federal Election Commission (FEC) ID and either an
Employer Identification Number (EIN) (for organizations) or Social Security Number (for
individuals). Google collects such data and makes available a transparency report on
political ad spending by each advertiser/campaign. The transparency report lists top
advertisers and the amount of political ad spending by each advertiser. A recent
transparency report (as of June 6, 2020) provides this list of top political ad spending since
May 31, 2018:219

Google’s Regulation of Falsity and Misleading Content in Political Ads
Google also recently revised its rules about truth in advertising to prohibit ads with
“demonstrably false claims that could significantly undermine participation or trust” in
elections.220 Google has stated, however, that by reframing these truth-in-advertising rules,
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it does not intend to appoint itself as the arbiter of truth in politics. Google explains that
since “no one can sensibly adjudicate every political claim, counterclaim, and insinuation,”
it will focus its efforts on claims that are something more than generic falsehood or
exaggeration. It will not take comprehensive action against every misleading political ad
but will do so for “clear violations.” That line will likely be difficult to define and maintain.
In its announcement, Google gives the example of “deep fakes” as the type of content that
it will now remove. These are addressed by Google’s policy prohibiting “manipulating
media to deceive, defraud, or mislead others.” The example the company provides is
“deceptively doctoring media related to politics, social issues, or matters of public
concern.”221 Google has also released an open-source database containing 3,000
manipulated videos in order to help identify and target deepfakes.222
It is as yet unclear what falls within the category of demonstrably false political ads
according to Google,223 but a few examples provide some guidance. When YouTube CEO
Susan Wojcicki was asked whether YouTube would remove President Trump’s
advertisement (which he placed on Facebook) falsely accusing Joe Biden of corruptly
sheltering his son from a Ukrainian investigation through bribery, Wojcicki explained that
this ad “would not be a violation of our policies” because “politicians are always accusing
their opponents of lying.”224 On the other hand, Wojcicki cited the (now infamous) video
that showed Nancy Pelosi speaking at an artificially reduced rate, which made Pelosi
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appear to be drunk. Wojcicki noted that that video was removed “very fast” because “it’s
not okay to have technically manipulated content that would be misleading.”225
With respect to manipulated media in particular, YouTube has adopted specifically
applicable policies.226 Its deceptive practices policies state that “[C]ontent that has been
technically manipulated or doctored in a way that misleads users (beyond clips taken out
of context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm” are prohibited and will be
removed from YouTube.227 YouTube has further stated that it will remove content that
attempts to mislead people about the voting process or any other false information relating
to elections.228 YouTube also recently created an Intelligence Desk to help review
technically-manipulated content and take proactive approaches to mitigate the spread of
such content,229 and the company has also changed its recommendations systems to
prevent people from viewing misinformation on its site.230
III. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
POLITICAL MISINFORMATION

OF

PLATFORMS’ MEASURES

TO

COMBAT MEDICAL

AND

The efforts undertaken by the major social media platforms’ measures to address
medical and political misinformation are not without their problems. These efforts,
however, are generally consistent with First Amendment substantive and procedural
values, are trending in the right direction, and are by and large welcomed by the American
public. The platforms’ efforts are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny, since the
platforms are not state actors.231 On the contrary, the platforms enjoy great discretion with
respect to the choices they make regarding content regulation on their platforms, thanks to
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (at least for now).232 That said, the
225
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measures that the platforms have undertaken to combat misinformation have been largely
consistent with First Amendment substantive and procedural values.
First, the platforms’ most interventionist efforts with respect to false medical
misinformation and false/misleading statements of fact in the health and medical context
are consistent with First Amendment substantive values, in which lesser protection is
accorded for false and misleading statements of fact (especially in the medical field). While
the marketplace of ideas theory (and its default response of counterspeech as a remedy for
bad speech) accords broad protection to good and bad ideas, it does not accord the same
broad protections to good and bad claims or assertions of fact. The Supreme Court in
embracing the marketplace of ideas theory has made clear that there is no such thing as a
false idea—that all ideas are protected—but that false statements of fact are not similarly
immune from regulation. While the Court has sometimes recognized the minimal potential
contributions to the marketplace of ideas made by harmless lies233 or some false statements

on their platforms, providing that platforms cannot “be held liable on account of . . . any
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the provider or user considers to be obscene . . . excessively violent, harassing, or
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a challenge brought by Xavier Alvarez, who was convicted under the Act for publicly
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from First Amendment protection. See also Breyer, J., concurring in judgment, arguing
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counterspeech – i.e., if a list of medal recipients were made available on the Internet.
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of fact,234 it has also emphasized that the First Amendment does not stand in the way of
regulating intentionally false or misleading harmful assertions of fact, 235 especially in the
medical context. Indeed, with regard to false and misleading statements of fact regarding
medical treatments, cures, medicine, etc., the Food and Drug Administration and the
Federal Trade Commission have extensive authority, consistent with the First Amendment,
to prohibit false and misleading claims. The FDA and the FTC are empowered to prohibit
the false or misleading branding, advertising, marketing, and/or sale of products –
including products that claim to be cures or treatments for COVID-19 – and these agencies
have recently cracked down on online purveyors of such products.236 Thus, it is not
inconsistent with First Amendment values for the social media platforms to undertake
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measures to combat false and misleading statements of fact, especially in the area of
medical and health related information.237
In addition, the platforms’ efforts to remove content likely to incite violence or
great public harm is consistent with the emergency exception in First Amendment
jurisprudence, as originally articulated by Holmes and Brandeis238 and as recognized by
the Court in its incitement jurisprudence in Brandenburg v. Ohio and progeny. Content
that is created or shared with the purpose of immediately contributing to or exacerbating
violence or physical harm is generally subject to regulation under the First Amendment’s
incitement jurisprudence, under which the government is permitted to regulate “advocacy
of … law violation . . . where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”239
Further, the platforms’ efforts to label less harmful false and misleading medical
information and to develop and refer users to accurate information revolves primarily
around providing counterspeech instead of implementing censorship as a remedy. This is
consistent with First Amendment substantive values and with the marketplace of ideas
theory of the First Amendment, according to which – ever since the formative years of
modern First Amendment jurisprudence – the accepted response to bad speech is not
censorship but more (better) speech. 240 As Justice Brandeis explained in his oft-quoted
concurrence in Whitney v. California, joined by Justice Holmes: “If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies [of speech], to avert the evil by the process
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”241 According
to the marketplace theory of the First Amendment, ideas should generally be allowed to
compete freely in the marketplace unfettered by government restrictions (absent
emergency conditions). The default remedy for harmful ideas in the marketplace of speech
is not censorship, but counterspeech, which operates by allowing those who are exposed to
bad speech to be exposed to good speech as a counterweight. The platforms’ efforts to
respond to false and misleading medical and political information by labeling them as such
and to refer users to accurate information is consistent with this counterspeech approach in
First Amendment jurisprudence. In addition, the platforms’ efforts in regulating
misinformation in political speech and political advertising contribute toward “producing
an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs” and facilitating the preconditions
necessary for citizens to engage in the task of democratic self-government,242 which are
also foundational goals of our First Amendment jurisprudence.
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The platforms’ efforts are also generally consistent with First Amendment
procedural values and with principles of due process generally.243 The First Amendment’s
protections for freedom of expression not only embody a substantive dimension of which
categories of speech to protect; they also embody procedural dimensions, imported from
the Due Process Clause, which require that “sensitive tools” be implemented by
decisionmakers in restricting speech.244 As free speech theorist Henry Monaghan explains,
“procedural guarantees play an equally large role in protecting freedom of speech; indeed,
they assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be
applied.”245 Accordingly, First Amendment jurisprudence incorporates a powerful “body
of procedural law which defines the manner in which [decisionmakers] must evaluate and
resolve [free speech] claims — [establishing] a First Amendment due process.”246 This
jurisprudence embodies “a comprehensive system of procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system.”247 Consistent with these procedural safeguards
embodied in First Amendment jurisprudence, social media platforms should impose speech
restrictions on medical and political misinformation in a clear, neutral, and transparent
manner, such that speakers are adequately and clearly informed of the platforms’ rules
regarding speech, speakers are specifically informed of the reasons why their speech was
restricted (removed or labeled), such decisions are made consistently by impartial
decisionmakers, and speakers have an opportunity to be heard/to appeal any such speech
restrictions. In general, the platforms have provided clear notice to users of their (evolving)
terms of service regarding medical and political misinformation and have provided users
with clear notice when implementing speech removal or labeling decisions. For example,
as discussed above, when Twitter restricted Donald Trump, Jr.’s posts embodying false
claims about and unproven cures for COVID-19 on the grounds that the post violated
Twitter’s rules regarding medical misinformation,248 it did so in the context of providing
clear prior notice of what speech was restricted and a process to appeal Twitter’s
decisions,249 and it also provided notice to Trump, Jr., of the specific reason why his speech
was restricted. See below.
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In short, the extensive measures undertaken by the major social media platforms to respond
to false and misleading misinformation in the medical and political contexts are generally
consistent with our First Amendment substantive and procedural values.
In addition, recent studies have shown that the efforts undertaken by the major
social media platforms’ measures to address political and medical misinformation have
been moderately successful. As Hunt Allcott and his co-authors report in their article
Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social Media, based on their study of “trends
in the diffusion of content from 570 fake news websites and 10,240 fake news stories on
Facebook and Twitter between January 2015 and July 2018,” while “[u]ser interactions
with false content rose steadily on . . . Facebook . . . through the end of 2016,” since then,
“interactions with false content have fallen sharply.”250 The authors of the study find that
“user interaction with known false news sites has declined by 50 percent since the 2016
election.“251 Based on these findings, the authors conclude that “efforts by Facebook
following the 2016 election to limit the diffusion of misinformation [namely, the “suite of
policy and algorithmic changes made by Facebook following the 2016 election”252] may
have had a meaningful impact.”253
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Further, the labeling of content as false or misleading on social media platforms has
been shown to be effective in limiting the dissemination of such false or misleading
content. According to a recent study, social media users were about 50% less likely to share
false stories if the stories had been labeled as false. With no labels being used at all,
participants considered sharing 29.8 percent of false stories in the sample, but that figure
dropped to 16.1 percent of false stories that had a label attached.254 In addition, the labeling
of posts as false led to improved accuracy in social media users’ beliefs. Researchers found,
in an exhaustive series of surveys across more than 10,000 participants on a wide range of
topics, that 60% of respondents gave accurate answers when presented with a factcheck/correction, while only 32% expressed accurate beliefs when they were not presented
with a fact-check/correction.255
Finally, there is broad public support among Americans for social media platforms’
continuing to take a meaningful role in combating political and medical misinformation on
their platforms. A March 2020 Knight Foundation/Gallup Poll found that the vast majority
of Americans surveyed (81%) supported the removal of intentionally misleading
information on elections or other political issues, and an even greater majority of
Americans surveyed (85%) supported social media companies’ removal of intentionally
misleading health information.256
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CONCLUSION
Social media platforms are playing an ever-expanding role in shaping the contours of
information ecosystem today, as these platforms have shouldered the burden of ensuring
that the public is informed – and not misinformed – about matters affecting our democratic
institutions in the context of our elections, as well as about matters affecting our very health
and lives in the context of the pandemic. The platforms are attempting to address these
serious problems alone, in the absence of federal or state regulation or guidance in the
United States. While the platforms’ intervention in the online marketplace of ideas is not
without its problems, this Article has argued that this intervention is by and large a salutary
development and is one that has brought about improvements in the online information
ecosystem. Social media companies have been generally inspired by First Amendment free
speech values – both substantive and procedural – to protect a vibrant marketplace of ideas
online while imposing limited, moderately effective checks on harmful false and
misleading speech, with complex systems of removal, fact-checking, and labeling, and by
serving up prominent information from independent fact-checkers and trusted authorities
to counter medical and political misinformation. In the absence of effective regulatory
measures in the United States to combat medical and political misinformation online, social
media companies should be commended for their efforts thus far and should continue to
develop and deploy even more successful measures to combat such misinformation online.
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